Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy by Hines, N.William




Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact
and Fancy
N.William Hines
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hines, N.William, "Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 1991.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1991
Personal Property Joint Tenancies:
More Law, Fact and Fancy
N. William Hines*
I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Although resistance to abrupt change is an essential char-
acteristic of an effective property law, rules which remain in-
transigent in the face of obvious changes in their factual bases
often frustrate the intention and expectation of property owners.
In an earlier empirical study, it was argued that the policy of
the law toward joint tenancy of real estate is an obstacle to
realization of property owner intent.' This article, based on an
empirical study of joint ownership of personal property, will
evaluate the soundness of the law of personal property joint
tenancies, in light of this intent.2
This article will first discuss the relevancy (or irrelevancy)
of the joint tenancy law by juxtaposing the statutes and case law
with empirical data on property owners' practices and attitudes.
To the extent inconsistencies are revealed, suggestions will be
made for improvement of the legal framework. Some of these
suggestions will be in the form of recommended legislation. The
study reported herein was undertaken in the belief that reliable
information about the working of the law in action is an essential
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and Fancy,
51 IowA L. REV. 582 (1966).
2. A comment about the terminology to be used is necessary.
Today, the term "joint tenancy" is used by laymen and lawyers to
describe a multitude of lawful co-ownership arrangements, the common
characteristic of which is a right of survivorship. Measured by the
technical standards applied to the estate of joint tenancy at common
law, many of the modern co-ownership designs would certainly be found
wanting, yet they are widely tolerated by the law. No reason appears
for the exercise of greater technical care in the repeated references to
these arrangements in the ensuing discussion; therefore, the term "joint
tenancy" is used herein generally to denote ownership in which a
survivorship right is recognized. Tenancy by the entirety is deliberately
excluded from treatment. This ownership form is not recognized in
Minnesota, Mmx. STAT. § 500.19(1) (1967), nor in about one half of the
states. See Huber, Creditors' Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, I
B.C. IN. & COM. L. REV. 197 (1960). Many of the problems of tenancies
by the entirety in personalty are identical to those discussed herein with
respect to joint tenancies. However, the differences are significant, and
the decision was made to confine this article to joint tenancy, the owner-
ship form at which the empirical research was directed.
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component of research intended to generate law reform. The rec-
ommendations for improvement suggested herein are based in
great measure on perceptions of reality gained from this project
and from the earlier field work dealing with land transfers.
Several techniques may be employed to study property own-
ership and transfer patterns. Most studies in this area have
relied upon systematic examination of public records.3 While
such records are adequate sources of information for discerning
patterns of land transfer and testamentary disposition, the avail-
able personal property records do not sufficiently illuminate per-
sonal property ownership. 4 Because most personal property
holdings are not documented, the researcher must directly con-
tact the owners. Needless to say, such research creates problems
not encountered in the examination of impersonal public and
private records.
Problems facing the interviewing researcher include sam-
pling errors which may bias his data, question ordering which
may jeopardize completion of the interview, question timing
which may sensitize his respondent, question phrasing which
may elicit responses too broad or too narrow, coding which blurs
or unduly accentuates factual distinctions and use of attitudinal
scales with which the respondent cannot identify.
After several false starts and some pilot testings, what
seemed to be a workable questionnaire was produced. The ques-
tions were designed to elicit detailed information about the prop-
erty owner and his assets and to ascertain the ownership form
in which the assets were held, the identity of co-owners, and the
factors which influenced the choice of ownership form. In the
summer of 1967, a team of four senior law students interviewed
a group of randomly selected property owners in five Iowa coun-
3. See, e.g., Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa
Water Permit System--Part One, 7 NiT. REs. J. 499 (1967); Hines, A
Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System-Part Two,
8 NAT. REs J. 23 (1968); Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency
of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. Ci. L. REV. 241 (1963); Ward
& Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIs. L. REv.
393; Powell & Looker, Decedants' Estates-Illumination from Probate
and Tax Records, 30 COLo. L. REv. 919 (1930).
4. It may be possible to obtain information on property holding
forms from the files of banking institutions, brokerage houses, stock
transfer agents, lenders and other such repositories of title informa-
tion. Obtaining access to this data may be a problem, however, since
the holder regards much of it as confidential information. Courthouse
records, on the other hand, are open but are not sufficiently helpful.
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ties.' Property owner cooperation was generally excellent and
the interviewers returned with 175 completed schedules. The
information was coded, punched into computer cards and pro-
cessed through the use of a simple tabulation and correlation pro-
gram run on an IBM 360 computer. The results will be presented
in tabular form in the appendices.
While the results of the study are generally reinforced by
external evidence,6 they are of limited scientific reliability. The
modest size of the sample combined with the large number of
variables produces many categories but relatively few entries.
Thus, the accuracy of the results cannot be statistically assured.
Two other factors may also limit the data's reliability. First,
self-selection played a major role in the group sampled.7 Sec-
ond, the question-answer method of determining the ownership
form has an inherent hearsay quality. What is reported is the
ownership form under which the respondents said their property
was held. Verification of their opinions was not practical. How-
ever, to the extent the ensuing discussion turns on questions of
what property owners intend, the evidence collected is perhaps
more probative than official records would be.
II. THE LAW-FACT GAP
Although joint tenancy was originally regarded as an own-
ership form limited to real estate, personal property joint ten-
ancies were recognized fairly early.8 The early common law
favored joint tenancy ownership of land and also, so it seems,
5. The five counties surveyed were Bremer, Humboldt, Guthrie,
Shelby and Johnson. Credit should be given to the following research-
ers who assisted so ably in the collection of data: Greg Carlson, cur-
rently assistant to the Attorney General of Minnesota; Philip Boelter,
now an associate with Dorsey, Marquart, Windhorst, West & Halladay
in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Forest Evashevski, Jr., now an associate with
Shuttleworth & Ingersoll in Cedar Rapids, Iowa and Richard Howes,
now an associate with Dickinson, Throckmorton, Parker, Mannheimer
& Raife in Des Moines, Iowa.
6. Statements describing the popularity of joint tenancy owner-
ship abound in the cases and in the legal literature. See, e.g., O'Brien
v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 1189, 11 N.W.2d 412, 417 (1943); Palmer v.
Flint, 156 Me. 103, 112, 161 A.2d 837, 842 (1960); Riecker, Joint Ten-
ancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64 MicE. L. REV. 801
(1966); Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife
in Personal Property: I, 52 MicH. L. REv. 779 (1954).
7. It should be noted that the sample may be biased by the fact
that the selection of interviewees was made initially from a population
of all real estate grantees in the five counties during 1964. Thus, the
sample includes only persons owning at least one parcel of real estate.
8. See Townsend, supra note 6, at 786-92.
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of tangible personaltyY A century ago, however, the courts be-
gan to express strong disapproval of survivorship arrange-
ments.10 This judicial change of heart was in response, directly
or indirectly, to statutes enacted in almost every state purporting
to abolish or limit the use of johat tenancy." The legislative
stance was probably based on the belief that survivorship was
repugnant to the desires of property owners. 2
It is difficult to square this rationale with the fact that mil-
lions of Americans annually go to some lengths to assure that
their ownership arrangements include a survivorship provision. 3
Empirical studies are hardly necessary to substantiate the popu-
9. Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Mnm. L.
Rlv 446, 479 (1954), citing Co. LIIT. §§ 281-82 (Wambaugh trans.
1903); Co. lawT. *182a. Coke notes an exception as to the goods, in-
eluding "debts," of joint merchants. See also J. WLTLAms, P_ SoNAL
PROPERTY 520 (18th ed. 1926). Note, Joint Tenancy in Wisconsin Es-
pecially as Regards Personal Property, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 154, 164.
10. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302, 307 (1869), where the
court stated:
With us, therefore, when the estate is held by two or more, not
as trustees, but in their own right, nothing being expressed to
the contrary, the tenancy would be in common. And thus most
plainly and authoritatively is the estate of joint tenancy dis-
favored by our law. There is no reason, no necessity, for such
an estate, except under the most peculiar circumstances..
And as now we in most of the States condemn entailments, or
perpetuities, so we do and should joint tenancies, or at least
their common-law incident-the right of survivorship.
See generally J. W ILl m, supra note 9, at 522 and Swenson & Degnan,
supra note 9, at 468.
11. Assuming joint tenancy was originally the preferred construc-
tion in both realty and personalty, the reasons underlying the two pref-
erences were quite different. Joint tenancy of real estate was initially
advantageous to the English nobility in facilitating collection of feudal
incidents. After the invention of the enfeoffment to use, the estate was
employed by landowners to avoid imposition of incidents. See 2 Amnil-
cAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 4 W. HormswoRTH,
I-hSTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 446 (1924). Joint tenancy of tangible per-
sonalty, on the other hand, was favored on the more practical ground
that it avoided difficult problems of dividing up assets not readily divi-
sible. In re Levy's Will, 234 Wis. 31, 289 N.W. 666 (1940). Because of
this dichotomy, it is not surprising to see occasional arguments that
current legislative and judicial disfavor of survivorship rights should
be limited to real property co-ownerships. See Note, supra note 9, at
158-66.
12. See York v. Stone, 1 Salk. 158, 91 Eng. Rep. 146 (Ch. 1709);
Edwards v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1939); Hoyt v. Win-
stanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213 (1922); Montgomery v. Keystone
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 150 Pa. Super. 577, 29 A.2d 203 (1942).
13. See Bloom, Joint Tenancy: Can It Work For You? RnEAm's
DIGEsT, Oct. 1967, at 163; U.S. TRFAs. DEP'T, STAnsTxcs or INCOME FOR
1949 (Part I) 352-53 (1954).
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larity of joint tenancy, but a glance at the data collected illus-
trates the variety14 and value' 5 of property subject to survivor-
ship, and the dispersion of its use among age groups16 and occu-
pation types.'7 So deeply entrenched is the joint and survivor
holding form in the ownership of some types of property that
it is unhesitatingly adopted by most laymen and many lawyers. 8
The frequent and forceful warnings by legal writers 9 and fam-
ily lawyers 20 against careless use of joint tenancy have been in-
effective to stem the tide. Reason suggests that an ownership
form that abounds in spite of disapproval by the law and the
disfavor of legal advisors must be more harmonious with prop-
erty owners' desires than repugnant to them. The swing of the
property law pendulum is supposed to trail movements in own-
ership preferences, but wondrous forces of inertia must be at
work to cause the astonishing lag in the joint tenancy area.
14. See Appendix I. Data were collected concerning 33 categories
of property. The categories were developed from experience gained in
pre-tests of the interview schedule. As might have been expected, joint
tenancy is used most often in the ownership of the family home, the
home farm, bank accounts, bonds and stock. The relatively high fre-
quency of joint tenancy ownership of such items as household goods
and many types of real estate is somewhat surprising.
15. See Appendix II. As might be expected, the proportion ofjoint tenancy ownership is generally highest at the low value ranges and
lowest at the high ranges. The incidence does, however, remain sur-
prisingly high in the $20,000-$80,000 range. At $60,000, federal tax
factors making joint tenancy disadvantageous begin to operate, yet al-
most 50 percent of the property items over that value were held in
joint tenancy.
16. See Appendix I. The range of disparity in joint ownership
usage between age groups is small. Although it might have been ex-
pected that the young owner was responsible for the relatively recent
surge in popularity of joint tenancy, this does not appear to be the case.
17. See Appendix IV. If joint tenancy is truly the "poor man's
will," it would be expected to enjoy a wider usage among lower income
occupation types than higher income owners and be more frequently
employed for low value property than for high. See Appendix II. In
neither case, however, are the differences so great as to suggest a
meaningful pattern.
18. Harl, Estate and Business Planning for Farmers, 19 HAST. L.J.
271 (1968); Hines, supra note 1, at 595.
19. See Riecker, supra note 6; Stacey, Joint Tenancy and Estate
Planning, 37 WA.sm L. REV. 44 (1962); Young, Tax Incidents of Joint
Ownership, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 972.
20. See Appendix V. Information was collected on the sources of
influence affecting property owners' selection of ownership form. Attor-
neys influenced the choice of joint tenancies in about the same number
of instances as did bankers, the other major source of influence. But
note that attorney advice was also reported in most instances of tenan-
cies in common.
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The question is thus raised as to why the law has not been
more responsive to popular repudiation of these legal assump-
tions. The most common hypothesis is that the courts have suffi-
ciently ameliorated the policy of disfavoring survivorship so as to
make joint tenancy serviceable to the needs of the average prop-
erty owner. The following discussion will endeavor to disclose
both the support for, and the arguments against, this theory.
The legal problems raised by attempts to subject personal
property to joint tenancy ownership generally fall into two cate-
gories. One set of questions concerns the nature and quantum
of proof required to sustain a finding that a joint tenancy was
created; the other concerns the consequences of creation both to
co-owners and to third parties. In considering both matters, the
reader should question whether present legal principles ade-
quately serve those who use the joint tenancy.
A. CREATION
Traditionally, the creation of a joint tenancy in any property
required the conjunction of the "four unities'"-time, title, inter-
est and possession. 21 Thus, the co-owners must have received
the same quantum and duration of interest and right to posses-
sion by the same transfer instrument at the same time. In rela-
tion to real estate ownership, the four unities standard for judg-
ing the validity of an attempted creation of a co-ownership with
survivorship rights has been slowly eroded.22 It is, however,
still important in some jurisdictions.2 3
The statutes reversing the corrnon-law presumption favor-
ing joint tenancy often provided that a co-ownership would be
deemed a tenancy in common unless a contrary intent was ex-
pressed.24 Courts in a number of states have held that, as to
joint tenancies, this provision eliminates the four unities re-
21. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 180-84, (15th ed. 1809). See
generally C. MoYmIu, INTRODuCTioN TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
217 (1962); 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 418 (3d ed. 1939).
22. See Hines, supra note 1; 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1777 (1968 Supp.).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966); Si-
monich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 417 P.2d 1.39 (1966); In re Estate of Ogier,
175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963).
24. See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 50-411 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. § 701
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.15 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-104
(1947); IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.15 (1950); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
184, § 7 (1958); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-313 (1947); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 477:18 (1955).
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quirement in favor of a statutory standard of intent.25 The
four unities test has thus been almost totally abandoned. Little
uniformity in the inclusion of personal property is found among
general statutes restricting joint tenancies. Some statutes refer
only to real estate co-ownerships, 26 some speak broadly enough
to fairly include both types,27 and a number specifically include
personal property.28 Nevertheless, through statutory construc-
tion or judicial fiat, the policy against survivorship arrange-
ments has generally been applied to co-ownerships of personal
property as well as to those of real estate.
Six states expressly exempt husband and wife co-owner-
ships from the statutory presumption against joint tenancy.29
As the data show, husband and wife joint tenancies account for
the great majority of personal property co-ownerships.30 These
25. See, e.g., Florida Natl Bank v. Gann, 101 So. 2d 579 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946);
Haynes v. Barker, 239 S.W.2d 996 (Ky. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
26. Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 33-431 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-
2-1 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. § 701 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.§ 7 (1958); MN. STAT. § 500.19 (1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.450
(1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.18 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. 70-1-14
(1953); OE. REV. STAT. § 93.020 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1967).
27. ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 19 (1958); IOWA CODE ANN. § 557.15
(1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 9 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 67-313, 67-308, 67-310 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-17 (1940);
N.Y. ESTATE, PowERs AND TRUSTS LAW, § 6-2.21 (McKinney 1967); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 121 (1950);
5 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-55 (1962).
28. ALAs. STAT. § 34.15.130 (1962) (joint tenancy abolished with the
exception of interests in personalty and tenancy by the entirety); Au.
STAT. ANN. § 61-114 (1947); CAL. CIrV. CODE § 683 (West 1954); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-816, 45-823 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.15 (1969);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-104, 85-1002 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 55-104,
55-508 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 2.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 51-104 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 381.120, 381.130 (1953); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 160, 901
(1965); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.157 (1967) (as to certain classes
of personal property, gift is presumed); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.065 (1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 74 (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-3-1 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-107 (1955);
TEx. Cxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 2, § 46 (Vernon 1956); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-20,
55-21 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.010 (1966); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-1-19, 36-1-20 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.45 (1957); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 34-40.1 (1969 Supp.).
29. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-431 (1956); IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-112
(1962); MVicn. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.151 (1967); Mo. REV. STAT. §
442.450 (1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
230.45 (1957).
30. See Appendix VI. Information collected from the land records
in an earlier study indicated that 87 percent of all transfers of real
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facts are noted at this juncture simply to alert the reader to the
possibility of either tailoring the general law to fit the needs of
the most frequent user of joint tenancy or treating husband and
wife co-ownerships separately. As will be discussed later, the
preponderance of joint and survivor holdings between spouses
makes irrelevant many of the convemtional rationales for disap-
proving joint tenancy.3 1
The great variety of personal property forms precludes the
postulation of a test more specific than the intent standard for
determining whether joint tenancy has been created. For some
types of personal property co-ownerships, notably bank accounts,
it might be questioned whether even the concept of intent is
sufficient. A review of the decisions suggests that the more
solid and tangible the property, the more likely the court will
invoke relatively stringent requirements for a finding of joint
tenancy. As the property interests in issue become more ab-
stract and uncertain, the courts turn away from the old learning
and seek to sustain survivorship rights on less conventional
bases. Due to this judicial tendency to approach joint ten-
ancy issues from a standpoint that seems related to the mass
of the property involved, the following discussion treats tangi-
ble and intangible personalty separately. Empirical data are
reported and considered in conjunction with the legal materials
in each of the specific topics explored..
1. Tangible Personalty
Remarkably little law exists concerning either the require-
ments for the creation of a joint tenancy in tangible personal
property or the ramifications of such ownership. It has long
been generally accepted that tangible items of personal property
may be jointly owned and that the co-ownership may be made
subject to survivorship rights.3 2 Questions concerning the valid-
ity of attempts to create joint t~nancy in tangible personalty
are often decided by analogy to real estate joint tenancies. 83
This analysis is helpful in some cases, particularly those involv-
property to co-owners were to husband and wife joint tenants. See
Hines, supra note 1, at 617. In the current study, husband and wife
co-ownership of personalty was found to be equally pervasive. See
Appendix V.
31. See text accompanying notes 205-09 infra.
32. See, e.g., 2 AAMuIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 64 (A. Casner ed.
1952) and Townsend, supra note 6.
33. See In re Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 23-24, 79 N.W.2d 315,
819 (1956); Note, supra note 9, at 157.
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ing some form of transfer instrument or title document, but
leaves much to be desired when applied to the large number of
chattels where casual and informal ownership is the norm. Rec-
ognizing that it would be folly to attempt to resolve difficult
disputes concerning ownership of such chattel through reliance
on real estate law, the courts dutifully pay their respect to this
impressive body of law and then seek to discern the parties'
intent through careful scrutiny of the surrounding facts.34
Judging from the data, the three types of tangible personal
property most likely to be held in joint tenancy are motor ve-
hicles, farm chattels, and household and miscellaneous goods.33
While motor vehicles are regularly titled in a manner that per-
mits ready joint registration, a substantial amount of joint ten-
ancy ownership is found in the latter two types of property, the
ownership of which is usually characterized by ambigous and
unwritten arrangements.
(a) Motor Vehicles
The family automobile is often held in some form of joint
ownership.36 The frequency of joint and survivor ownership
seems to be relatively uninfluenced by age or occupation of the
owner 37 or by the value of the automobile.38 Automobile own-
ership is uniformly represented by title certificates which lend
themselves to a variety of co-owner designations, the most com-
mon of which are A and B, A or B, and A and/or B.
Notwithstanding the large number of automobile joint own-
erships, few cases litigating the effect of these ambiguous co-
owner designations have been reported. The reason for the
paucity of cases is not clear, but when it is observed that almost
all such co-ownerships are between husband and wife,39 it is
probable that statutes facilitating the ability of a surviving
spouse to obtain a new title certificate have discouraged chal-
lenges to his claim.40 In the situations that have been reported,
34. See Horton v. Estate of Elmore, 420 S.W.2d 48 (Kan. City Ct.
of App. 1967); Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1962).
35. See Appendix L
36. Id. (40 percent joint tenancy ownership for first cars). The
study also turned up 10 second cars of which two were held in joint
tenancy.
37. See Appendix VII.
38. See Appendix VIII.
39. The field study showed 164 first automobiles of which all 78jointly held were held between spouses.
40. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. ST. ANN. §§ 28-314(B), 28-315 (1956); ILL.
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the courts have tended to construe the language in the title cer-
tificate in favor of survivorship.41
(b) Farm Chattels
The variety of arrangements by which personal property is
held in agricultural states suggests that one common problem
is the ownership of tangibles used in the family farm business.
The data show that farmers report joint tenancy ownership of
farm chattels with a significant degree of regularity.42 There
is a high frequency of husband and wife co-ownership,43 but no
clear pattern emerges in relation to the age of the farmer or
the value of the chattel. Farmers owning land in joint tenancy
STAT. ANN. ch. 95-%, § 3-114 (Smith.-Hurd 1958); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 231.47 (1966); Cf. note 48 infra.
41. For example, in Illinois, "[tihe Secretary of State does not
require, for the issuance of a title certificate to one claiming as the
surviving joint tenant, that the original title certificate creating the
joint tenancy negate in common [sic]." Moss & Siebert, Classification
and Creation of Joint Interests, 1959 U. IL. L.F. 883, 917.
In addition, the wisdom of placing title to the family auto in joint
tenancy might be questioned in some jurisdictions where a driver's
negligence might be imputed to an owner-passenger. Such ownership
may imperil the ability of a co-owner to recover or to defend in a per-
sonal liability suit growing out of an accident involving the jointly
owned vehicle. If an injured passenger is an owner, the possibility ex-
ists that his recovery for negligence of the other driver will be barred
because contributory negligence of the driver of his own car may be
imputed to him. See Phillips v. Foster, 252 Iowa 1075, 1083, 109 N.W.2d
604, 608 (1961). Similarly, an owner-passenger may be held respon-
sible either by statute, e.g., CAL. VEMCLE CODE § 17150 (West 1960) or
common law. See Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30
N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1941). In the absence of statute, ownership
alone is ordinarily not a sufficient ground for the imputation of liability;
some form of control over the conduct of the driver is required. See
Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich. 387, 91 N.W.2d 485 (1958); Parker v. Mc-
Cartney, 216 Ore. 283, 338 P.2d 371 (1959); Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va.
840, 71 S.E.2d 355 (1952). However, the owner's presence in the vehicle
may create a presumption of control. Matheny v. Central Motor Lines
Inc., 233 N.C. 681, 65 S.E.2d 368 (1951); :Emerich v. Bigsby, 231 Wis. 473,
286 N.W. 51 (1939). Where the family auto is jointly owned by two
or more persons, the likelihood of the above described difficulties aris-
ing is proportionately increased.
42. See Appendix IX.
43. See Appendix X. For example, for farm trucks 11 of 12
joint tenancies were between husband and wife, for tractors 24 of 25,
for machinery 16 of 17, for equipment 5 of 6, for livestock 21 of 22,
and for severed crops and grain 7 of 18. The other co-ownerships re-
ported were almost always between parent and child.
Aside from the high incidence of husband and wife joint tenancies,
the most striking fact is the high number of tenancies in common with
siblings. This is likely explained by partnerships between brothers,
which occur fairly regularly in farming.
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report a higher use of joint ownership of assets associated with
the farm business than do farmers owning land individually, but
the difference is small.
The high incidence of joint tenancy ownership of farms44
would seem likely to spawn litigation to determine the owner-
ship of chattels closely associated with the farm operation. For
example, when a husband and wife hold title to the family farm
as joint tenants, are such items as the livestock, feed and ma-
chinery regarded as subject to the survivorship rights in the
farm or is their ownership independently determined? Similar
questions may arise in regard to an informal father and son
farm partnership or in other family arrangements. The few
cases involving farm chattels, however, provide little insight
into the factors relied upon to identify joint tenancy arrange-
ments.45 If an issue of this nature is to be resolved on the
basis of intent, close attention must be paid to the relationship
of the co-owners and their past course of conduct in relation to
other property. For example, inquiry could be directed to their
practices in reporting income from the property or declaring
ownership for property taxation and on financial statements.
Where a husband and wife owned the farm in joint tenancy,
there would seem to be a strong probability that they in-
tended to extend the survivorship right to personal property
closely associated with the land. Even if the land were not
44. See Hines, supra note 1, where it was reported that of all
deeds transferring farms in the five counties surveyed, approximately
38 percent involved joint tenancies.
45. This is in accord with what seems to have been the general rule
that ownership of the personal property is presumed to be in the hus-
band and not the wife where husband and wife live together in the
same house and on the same real estate. See Rhoads v. Gordon, 38 Pa.
277 (1861). Knox v. Trimble, 324 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1959) is in accord,
but the court notes that there is a modern tendency to modify the gen-
eral rule. Id. at 131. Although not cited in Knox, the modification
referred to may be Hill's Executor v. Young, 157 Ky. 42, 162 S.W. 558
(1914), where income derived from a jointly owned and managed farm
and other real property was found to be jointly owned. More recent
authority, albeit meager, indicates that a pattern of ownership as to
other items is relevant. In Vaughn v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367
(1937), joint possession was found to raise a presumption of joint
ownership with right of survivorship. In Block v. Schmidt, 296 Mch.
610, 617-18, 296 N.W. 698, 701 (1941), ownership of realty was deemed
"quite persuasive" as to the nature of the ownership of personalty. See
generally Annot. 111 A.L.R. 1374 (1937) and Effland, Estate Planning:
Co-ownership, 1958 Wis. L. Ruv. 507, 522-25. See also In re Ebdon, 198
Misc. 531, 98 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sur. Ct., Jefferson Co. 1950) (where livestock
is held in joint tenancy, offspring will be deemed jointly held). See
also note 49 infra.
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jointly owned, a pattern of holding other personalty in joint
tenancy should be persuasive evidence for finding a survivor-
ship right in the chattels, at least as between farm spouses. In
joint tenancies between persons other than husband and wife,
the intent is not so easily inferred from the parties' relationship;
therefore, the difficulty of proving joint tenancy should be sub-
stantially greater. Where the effect of finding a joint tenancy
would be to cut out natural objects of the deceased's bounty,
a very strong showing of intent to create joint tenancy ought
to be required.
(c) Household and Miscellaneous Goods
The data reveal a substantial amount of joint tenancy own-
ership of household goods and other items ordinarily found in
and around the home.46 In the sense that these assets are likely
to take on the ownership coloration of the home itself, they
share many of the qualities of the farm chattels discussed above.
Given the high incidence of joint tenancy ownership of the fam-
ily home, it is natural for the co-owners to believe and intend
that items of personal property closely associated with the home
are held in the same manner. Although it is unlikely that any
reliable documentation exists, to the extent that ownership turns
on intent, it seems that the owners' understanding of the own-
ership arrangement is legally correct. While, as with other per-
sonalty, it could be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of a
court the existence of an intent which was never articulated,
the consistent pattern of husband and wife co-ownership4 7 would
seem to reinforce the probability of this intent. The likelihood
that such an intent did indeed exist must strongly repress the
cupidity of potential contestants because the survivor's claim
of ownership to household goods is almost never challenged. 48
In the few cases that have arisen, the courts have emphasized
the probability of a survivorship intent growing out of the man-
ner in which other property was held.49
46. See Appendix I.
47. See Appendix XI.
48. Another explanation might be that the items of property are of
insufficient value to spark a dispute. Most respondents valued their
household effects at between $1000 and $3000. See Appendix XII. In
most states such items are awarded to 1he surviving spouse as exempt
personalty.
49. The general rule, as with farm chattels, appears to be that
"personal property in the joint possession of husband and wife, or con-
cerning which there is no independent evidence as to which of them is
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2. Intangibles
Discovering and analyzing the law of joint tenancy as it
relates to intangible personalty involves considerations different
from those applicable to tangibles. A primary difference is that
unlike tangibles, interests in intangibles are almost always evi-
denced by some instrument of title or transfer. Therefore, most
disputes involve efforts to construe or vary the language of a
writing. In addition, the cases are much more numerous, espe-
cially in regard to bank accounts.
(a) Corporate Securities
Over half the stocks and other corporate securities reported
in the field study were held jointly.5 0 Nearly all joint tenants
were spouses,5 1 but no clear patterns emerged as to the owners'
ages or occupations, or the value of the stock.52
Both article eight of the Uniform Commercial Code53 and
the rules of the major stock exchanges 4 defer to local law on
the effect of registration of securities in a joint and survivorship
form, and, as might be expected, local law varies greatly. A
number of states have statutes protecting corporations which
recognize survivorship among shareholders. 5 Several states
in possession, is presumed to belong to the husband." Blanpied's Estate
v. Robinson, 155 Colo. 133, 145, 393 P.2d 355, 361 (1964). Cf. Dura Seal
Prod. Co. v. Carver, 186 Pa. Super. 425, 427, 140 A.2d 844, 845 (1958)
wherein it is noted, quoting In re King's Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127, 126 A.2d
463, 467 (1956), that a wife could overcome the presumption "by evi-
dence that she paid for or inherited the furnitures [sic] or acquired it by
gift, or that they jointly paid for it, or by any other evidence sufficient
to prove ownership." A more realistic approach was taken in Hutchins
v. Hutchins, 113 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1959) where the court found a pre-
sumption that property, real and personal, purchased by a husband was
intended as a gift to the wife so that she became a joint tenant therein
and had a property interest which required protection at the time of a
divorce. See generally Annot., 111 A.L.R. 1374 (1937) and 41 C.J.S.
Husband and Wife § 273 (b) (1944).
50. See Appendix VIH.
51. See Appendix XIII.
52. See Appendix XIV. The value figures are the most interesting
of the group. Joint tenancy ownership does tail off in the higher
value ranges, as estate planners suggest it should, but the number of
high value stocks is too small to be significant.
53. E.g., Mnm.w. STAT. ch. 336, art. 8 (1967).
54. The only provisions relating to joint ownership of securities
found in the rules of the New York Stock Exchange concern standard-
ized abbreviations of joint tenancy holding forms. N.Y.S.E. CoiuPANY
MANUAL § A-12, at A-214.
55. See, e.g., Aaxz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-175 (1956); CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 2414 (West 1955); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 76, § 2(b) (Smith-Hurd
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have statutes specificially providing for the creation of joint
tenancies in stocks.56 One state has recently enacted legislation
expressly covering the incidents of joint ownership of corporate
securities.57 In the absence of legislative guidance, the courts
continue to divide over such questions as whether a valid de-
livery is required to create a joint tenancy in stock,58 and
whether the four unities must exist before a valid joint tenancy
is recognized.59 Fortunately, the courts show no propensity to
distinguish among different types of corporate securities; deben-
tures, bonds, common and preferred stock all seem to be treated
similarly.
It is interesting to speculate on the degree to which the
practices of brokerage houses and transfer agents affect prop-
erty owners' decisions in the creation of stock co-ownerships.
Large brokerage firms typically rely on highly standardized form
agreements which offer the option of creating what is designated
as a "joint registration."6  Unless specifically directed otherwise,
stock purchased on behalf of an account holder will be registered
in the same fashion as the account. The account agreement
form generally does not specify the incidents of the joint ac-
count; some firms, however, explain to customers that it creates
1966); REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN. § 23A.08.320 (1969). Cf. TEx. CODES
ANN. (Bus. & Comm.) § 8.207 (Vernon 1968), replacing TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-6.04 (Vernon 1962).
56. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1-5 (1964); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 76,
§ 2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1966); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 557.151(1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-407 (Supp. 1967).
57. N.C. GEm. STAT. § 25-8-407 (Supp. 1967). See also Edwards &
Wood, Joint Ownership of Corporate Securities in North Carolina Re-
visited, 46 N.C.L. REV. 520 (1968).
58. See Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952)
(possession by one joint tenant is possession by both). See also Bunt v.
Fairbanks, 81 S.D. 255, 134 N.W.2d 1 (1965). The court in In re Hutchi-
son's Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929) stated that the fact
that the certificate was in the possession and custody of one joint tenant
is "relatively unimportant." "It was little more than a 'scrap of paper.'
It might have been lost or destroyed, but the records of the corporation
would still have disclosed their joint ownership and right of survivor-
ship." Id. at 548, 166 N.E. at 689. But see Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C.
313, 38 S.E.2d 222, rehearing denied, 226 N.C. 779, 39 S.E.2d 599 (1946).
59. Compare Petri v. Rhein, 257 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1958) (four uni-
ties not required), with Kuebler v. Kuebler, 131 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1961)
(four unities required). See also Crook v. Crook, 184 Cal. App. 2d 745,
7 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1960).
60. The larger brokerage firms utilize computer equipment; thus,
the account form is a rather spartan single page document with nu-
merous boxes to be checked.
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a survivorship right.61 Where stock is registered in the names
of the account owners as joint tenants, survivorship is assured,
but where the stock is held in street name, it might be ques-
tioned whether the broker's representation will prove accurate
in the many jurisdictions where co-ownerships are presumed to
be tenancies in common. Uncertainties in the effect of brokerage
joint accounts could be substantially eliminated by subjecting
such accounts to the same principles that are applied to joint
accounts in other financial institutions.62
The transfer agent might significantly influence the type of
holding by his handling of requests for joint registration of se-
curities. In dealing with stock transferred through brokers, the
transfer agent is likely to receive very routine instructions re-
garding registration; but what about the frequent transfer re-
quests he receives from private parties? Does he exercise some
control over the manner in which ambiguous plural ownerships
are registered? If so, has he developed his own guidelines for
categorizing unclear co-ownerships or does he request clarifi-
cation from the parties? What evidence there is suggests that
so long as the stockholders' taxpayer numbers are reported,
transfer agents tend to register the securities in whatever form
the parties request.63 Local legislation sustaining the validity
of the joint and survivorship form for holding title to all types
of personal property and clarifying the language necessary to
accomplish this result should suffice to remedy any problems
encountered by transfer agents in registering jointly owned se-
curities.6 4
(b) Contract Rights and Mortgages
The data suggest that contract rights are uncommon assets,
and the use of joint tenancy is insubstantial.65 The paucity of
61. Interview with Clark F. Mighell, White & Co. in Iowa City,
Iowa, Sept. 19, 1969.
62. See recommendations in text accompanying notes 215-24, infra.
63. For a discussion of the problems faced by transfer agents be-
cause of uncertain joint tenancy laws, see Orgain, The Texas Joint Ten-
ancy in Corporate Shares: Problems of the Stock Transfer Agent, 16
BAYLOR L. REv. 99 (1964).
64. See recommendations in text accompanying notes 205-14, infra.
In the alternative, a special statute governing joint ownership of corpo-
rate securities should be considered. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-407(Supp. 1967).
65. Only 17 cases of contract right ownerships were found. Of
these, six were held in joint tenancy. See Appendix L
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cases in this area would seem to reinforce the inference drawn
from the data. The two types of contract rights most likely to
be held in joint tenancy are real estate mortgage notes and land
contracts. Notwithstanding the fact that both these contracts
involve a security interest in real estate, under well established
equitable principles the interest of the mortgagee and the con-
tract vendor are personal property rights.6 6 Because both of
these contract rights often arise as the result of the lender's
transfer of real estate on credit, the high incidence of joint
tenancy in real estate titles makes it likely that the lender's
former holding has been carried forward into the secured con-
tract right. In several states, joint tenants who sell real estate
by land contract and intend to continue the survivorship right
in the proceeds may be frustrated by a perverse rule that such
a sale severs the joint tenancy.67
The requirements for creation of survivorship rights in the
benefits of contracts are a matter of widespread uncertainty.
The statutes of a few states expressly exclude certain types of
contracts from their general presumption against joint tenancy.08
Other states have special statutes governing the creation of joint
and survivor ownerships in contractual obligations. 9 These
statutes are generally held to be supplemental to the common
law rules for creating joint tenancy.70 In most states, however,
the only guidance for the creation of survivorship rights is to
be derived from the local court's attitude toward joint tenancies
in personalty. Where compliance with the common law formal-
ities is insisted upon, the contract itself should contain the req-
uisite language, though courts which use the intent standard
will probably recognize agreements external to the instrument.71
66. See generally A. CASNER & V. LEAC, CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY 648, 649 (1st Std. ed. 1950); W. WALSH, EQUiTY 415-54 (1930).
67. In re Estate of Baker, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956);
Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954). See also Swenson
& Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Mnsx. L. REV. 466, 476
(1954).
68. See, e.g., MIcm. CoMP. LAws AiN. § 557.151 (1967); Wis. STAT.
AwN. § 230.45 (1957).
69. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 683 (West 1954); ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 76, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MICH. COZM. LAWS ANN. § 557.151
(1967).
70. See Illinois Public Aid Comm'n v. Stifle, 14 Ill. 2d 344, 348,
153 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1958); David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co.,
342 Ill. App. 96, 110, 95 N.E.2d 725, 732 (1950).
71. Cf., O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 1211, 11 N.W.2d 412, 427
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(c) Safety Deposit Boxes
Nearly half the respondents reported ownership of a safety
deposit box, and almost all of these respondents said they owned
the box in joint tenancy.72 Rental contracts for safety deposit
boxes ordinarily provide only for joint access. It is not sur-
prising, however, that the layman would equate this arrange-
ment to a joint tenancy where, on the death of one party, the
survivor can quickly and secretly remove the contents of the
box,73 and convert any readily negotiable assets into cash. What
little legal authority there is, however, does not support the
respondents' belief that the survivorship right automatically af-
fixes to each asset in the box. 74 Recognizing the act of depositing
assets in a joint safety deposit box as affecting the ownership
interests of the assets would indeed appear to be an undesirable
policy. Every asset deposited would constitute a potential source
of litigation over the true ownership intent.
(d) Government Bonds
The United States Treasury sells savings bonds which may
be registered in a single type of co-ownership form, roughly
equivalent to a joint tenancy with the survivorship right.7 5
Among the property owners interviewed, government bonds
were popular investments; the survivorship form was particu-
larly favored. Where survivorship rights existed, the owner's
(1943); In re Whiteside's Estate, 159 Neb. 362, 368, 67 N.W.2d 141, 145
(1954).
72. See Appendix I.
73. The survivor may have to remove the assets before the institu-
tion learns of the death of the other co-tenant. In many states the bank
is prohibited from delivering the contents of the safe deposit box to
any person other than the estate representative after notice of the de-
positor's death. See, e.g., Coxw. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-382 (1960);
IOWA CODE ANw. § 450.86 (1949).
74. See, e.g., David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill.
App. 96, 95 N.E.2d 725 (1950). See also Effland, supra. note 45.
75. 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (Rev. 1969): "A savings bond registered in
coownership form, for example, 'John A. Jones or Mrs. Mary C. Jones,'
will be paid... to either upon his separate request, and upon payment
to him the other shall cease to have any interest in the bond." 31
C.F.R. § 315.62 (Rev. 1969) entitled After death of one or both coowners
states: "If either coowner dies without the bond having been presented
and surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, the survivor will be
recognized as the sole and absolute owner. Thereafter, payment or re-
issue will be made as though the bond were registered in the name of
the survivor alone. .. "
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
spouse was the usual co-owner, but a higher proportion of par-
ent-child joint ownerships were observed than in most other
types of property.7 6
Given the varying recognition accorded joint tenancies in
the several states, it is not surprising that considerable conflict
once existed in the local law treatment of savings bond co-
ownerships.77 The view which has now been universally adopted
reasons on a contract theory that the registration form, which
incorporates by reference the regulations, constitutes a contract
between the federal government and the parties to the savings
bond.78 The effect of the contract is determined by federal law
to create certain rights among the parties. The supremacy clause
requires that the states honor and enforce such rights, which
include that of survivorship.
(e) Accounts
No type of personal property generates more litigation than
accounts with financial institutions held in a joint and survivor
form.7 9 One reason for the high number of cases may be the
76. See Appendix XV. The young and old alike reported bond
ownership; joint tenancy was about equally distributed among age
groups, ranging from 8 out of 10 joint tenancies in the 35-39 group to
7 out of 12 in the 60-and-over category. Similarly, occupation was not a
significant variable, although laborers did utilize joint tenancy holding
(seven out of eight in both the skilled and unskilled categories) more
than did farmers (14 out of 20) or businessmen (2 out of 5).
77. See Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 293 N.W. 841 (1940); Slater v.
Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953); see Annot., 37 A.L.R. 2d
1221 (1954). Such decisions have been overruled by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
78. Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 932, 48 N.W.2d 870, 877 (1951);
Conrad v. Conrad, 66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 285, 152 P.2d 221, 224 (1944);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 325 Mass. 257, 90 N.E.2d 338 (1950). See also
Note, Joint Tenancy in Wisconsin Especially as Regards Personal Prop-
erty, 1955 WIs. L. REv. 154, 161. The only exception to complete
control recognized by courts espousing this federal preemption theory is
a situation in which grounds for equitable intervention exist. For ex-
ample, where the co-ownership registration is proved to have been a
mistake or procured through fraud or undue influence, the courts will
impose a constructive trust on the surviving co-owner for the benefit of
the decedent's estate. See, e.g., Thorp v. Besozzi, 144 N.E.2d 430 (Ind.
1957); In re Chase's Estate, 348 P.2d 473, 481 (1960); Chase v. Leiter, 96
Cal. App. 2d 439, 215 P.2d 756 (1950); Olsen v. Olsen, 189 Misc. 1046, 70
N.Y.S.2d 838 (1947); In re Haas' Estate, 10 N.J. Super. 581, 77 A.2d 523
(1950).
79. Although the great majority of joint accounts are deposits
with bank institutions, this discussion is intended to include all joint and
survivor accounts. Illustrative are accounts with bank and trust com-
panies, savings banks, buildings and loan. associations, savings and loan
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sheer volume of such accounts. The data from the empirical
study shows that of the 175 respondents, 91 had savings accounts
and time certificates and 173 had checking accounts, of which 81
percent and 89 percent respectively were reported to be held in
joint and survivor form. The use of joint tenancy was not
statistically related to the age of the depositors nor to their
occupation.80 A second reason for the volume of litigation may
be the uncertain state of the law relating to such accounts.
Much of the confusion can be attributed to the fact that after 50
years the law relating to joint accounts is still evolving."' Courts
continue to search for a satisfactory doctrinal foundation to sup-
port results often obviously intended by the parties. Modern
courts repeatedly fail, however, to give full effect to the intent
of the parties since the applicable contract or property principles
are fraught with technical requirements. As yet, the courts
show little disposition to differentiate the several types of ac-
counts, except as dictated by special legislation.
At least three distinct intentions other than a pure ten-
ancy in common could motivate the creation of a joint ac-
count. One situation is where the persons intend that each
co-owner is to have power to deplete the account on his own
signature, with the survivor as sole owner of the balance. An
example is the ordinary husband and wife joint checking or
savings account.82  A second situation is where one party de-
sires to retain complete control over the account during his
lifetime, but wants any balance to pass at his death to a person
designated by him. Manifestations of this intent include joint
savings accounts where the passbook is retained in the possession
and control of the dominant co-owner, pay-on-death accounts,
and survivorship joint accounts in which withdrawals require
the signature of all living co-owners. The third situation is one
in which it is intended that one person have the power to make
withdrawals only for the benefit of another and that upon the
companies or associations, and credit unions. Other joint accounts are
found with investment brokers and regulated investment companies.
80. As Appendix XVI shows, value of the account was similarly
unrelated to joint tenancy usage; a high proportion of usage occurred at
all value levels. The data on savings accounts are similar.
81. See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Con-
cept Without a Name, 41 CAL. L. REV. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More
Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHr. L. REv. 376 (1959).
82. The data show a heavy preponderance of husband and wife co-
ownership in checking accounts. Figures on savings account ownership
display an even greater spousal character. See Appendix XVII.
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other's death, the balance becomes -part of his estate. Illustra-
tive of this arrangement is the situation where an invalid parent
will authorize withdrawals from his account by the child with
whom he lives.83 Unfortunately, neither banking laws nor prop-
erty laws consistently facilitate the realization of these inten-
tions, and their failure to do so regularly entraps joint account
owners unaware of the effect of their acts.
A bewildering variety of rules and presumptions are cur-
rently applied to creation of joint accounts. Nearly every state
has legislation affecting accounts owned in joint names. Gen-
erally, the statutes are of three types. Most state banking laws
contain provisions designed primarily to safeguard financial in-
stitutions in their dealings with co-owners of accounts.84 A few
states' banking laws specifically purport to govern property
rights in the accounts,8 5 and they are generally accorded that
effect by the courts.86 *Even without such language, however,
some states interpret the former statutes as dispositive of prop-
erty rights between the co-owners;87 others rule that property
rights are not affected.88 The third. type of statute is one de-
claring that the opening of an account in joint and survivorship
83. In effect then, the party making withdrawals for the benefit of
the person who has contributed the funds does so as the agent of the
second party. This agency relationship is sometimes made the basis of
a decision denying the survivorship incident. See Mitts v. Williams, 319
Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947); In re Kemmerer's Estate, 16 Wis. 2d
480, 114 N.W.2d 803 (1962).
84. All states except Kentucky have banking statutes of this na-
ture. See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, supra
note 81, at 604.
85. ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 128(2) (1960); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 36-3 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 515 (1964); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 384:28 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:37-1, 2 (Supp. 1954);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 809 (1958).
86. Miller v. Roseberry, 144 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1958). Cf. Bradley v.
State, 100 N.H. 232, 123 A.2d 148 (1956).
87. O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943); Dyste
v. Farmers and Mechanics Say. Bank of Minneapolis, 179 Minn. 430,
229 N.W. 865 (1930); In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So. 2d 20
(1943); In re Johnson's Estate, 116 Neb. 686, 218 N.W. 739 (1928); Haw-
kins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954); Barbour v. The
First Citizens Nat'l Bank of Watertown, 77 S.D. 106, 86 N.W.2d 526(1957); In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).
88. Gibson v. Industrial Bank of Wash., 36 A.2d 62 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1944); Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So. 2d 777 (1943); Clark
v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136 S.E. 444 (J.927); Malone v. Sullivan, 136
Kan. 193, 14 P.2d 647 (1932); Northcott v. Livingood, 10 So. 2d 401(La. App. 1942); Mathias v. Fowler, 124 Md. 655, 93 A. 298 (1915);
New Hampshire Sav, Bank v, McMullen, 88 N.H. 123, 185 A, 158 (1936);
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form creates a joint tenancy.8 9 The incidents which attach to
accounts opened in the prescribed statutory form are thus deter-
mined by the courts through reference to the jurisdiction's joint
tenancy law. 0
Unfortunately, different statutes in the same state will pro-
vide different techniques for creating such accounts and will set
forth varying rules governing their effect.9' The resulting vari-
ety of account contract forms confuse depositors and increase
the likelihood that the parties' intent will not be realized.
Judicial attitudes toward joint accounts fall into two schools
of thought. One school equates joint accounts to joint tenancies
and requires compliance with restrictive technicalities as a pre-
condition to creation of a survivorship arrangement. These cases
turn on such issues as whether "A or B" was an adequate mani-
festation of intent to create a joint tenancy,92 whether the sur-
vivorship account was a testamentary device" and whether a
gift was completed when money was deposited in survivorship
where the donee co-owner had no present right to reach the
funds.9 4
Nichols v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 542, 31 N.E.2d 224
(1941); Lay v. Proctor, 147 Ore. 545, 34 P.2d 331 (1934); Peoples Say.
Bank in Providence v. Rynn, 57 R.I. 411, 190 A. 440 (1937); Pruett v.
First Nat'l Bank of Temple, 175 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Holt
v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715 (1934).
89. Amx. ST-T. ANx. § 67-521 (1947); CAL. Ffn. CODE § 852 (West
1968); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-6 (1964); MicH. CoroP. LAws
AxN. § 487.703 (1968); Mo. AN. STAT. § 362.470 (1968); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 663.010 (1967); N.Y. BA.mnG § 675 (McKinney Supp. 1969);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.20.015 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ArN.
§ 31-8-23 (1966).
90. See Powell v. Powell, 222 Ark. 918, 263 S.W.2d 708 (1954).
See generally Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Mud-
dle, supra note 81, at 391-94.
91. Compare, e.g., IOWA CODE AXN. § 528.64 (1949), with IowA
CODE ANN. § 534.11 (Supp. 1969); and CAL. Fn. CODE § 852, with
§ 11204 and § 5600 (West 1968).
92. VanPelt v. West Essex Say. & Loan Ass'n, 91 N.J. Super. 164,
219 A.2d 527 (1966); Lombardie v. First Nat'l Bank of Hancock, 23 App.
Div. 2d 713, 257 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1965).
93. Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958); Ander-
son v. Lewis, 342 Mich. 53, 68 N.W.2d 774 (1955); In re Creekmore's
Estate, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 135 N.E.2d 193, 152 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1956).
94. Succession of Grigsby v. Hamilton, 219 So. 2d 832 (La. App.
1969); Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953); Sil-
bert v. Silbert, 22 App. Div. 2d 893, 255 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1964); In re Sivak's
Estate, 409 Pa. 261, 185 A.2d 778 (1962); Balfour's Estate v. Seitz, 392 Pa.
300, 140 A.2d 441 (1958).
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The opposing view tends to treat the joint account as a dis-
tinct species of property ownership deserving special treatment.
The phrase "poor man's will" echoes through the opinions 5
Whether the holdings are explained in terms of effectuating the
parties' intent under joint tenancy law,96 on progressive contract
law principles, 97 on a gift theory9 or even on a trust rationale,99
the result is usually the same-the survivor takes the funds. Lan-
guage purporting to create a joint and survivor arrangement is
given a strong presumptive effect; in many cases the presumption
appears to be conclusive. 100 Decisions begin with the premise that
the account arrangement is valid and then consider such ques-
tions as whether the survivorship right can be revoked by acts
less persuasive than execution of a formal change in the account
contract.' 0 ' -
It is in this area that some courts might move too quickly to
recognize and enforce survivorship rights. Since adequate "con-
venience" arrangements are not generally available for accounts,
a person suffering from or fearing some mental or physical dis-
ability is sometimes forced to utilize a joint account so that
another person can make withdrawals on his behalf. A sub-
stantial risk exists that such a person will be offered the
95. See, e.g., Pace v. First Nat'l Bank of Osawatomie, 277 F. Supp.
19 (D. Kan. 1965); O'Brien v. Biegge:, 233 Iowa 1179, 1189-90, 11
N.W.2d 412, 417 (1943); Melton v. Ensley, 421 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. App.
1967); Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262,
247 A.2d 771 (1968). See generally Note, Disposition of Bank Ac-
counts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 103 (1953).
96. Prather v. Hill, 250 A.2d 690 (D.C. App. 1969); Presgrove v.
Robbins, 451 P.2d 961 (Okla. 1969).
97. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148 N.W.2d 468
(1967); Bowen v. Hathaway, 202 Kan. 107, 446 P.2d 723 (1968); Miles v.
Hanten, - S.D. -, 164 N.W.2d 601 (1969).
98. Saylor v. Southern Ariz. Bank & Trust Co., 8 Ariz. App. 368,
446 P.2d 474 (1968); Urban v. Jackson, 434 P.2d 889 (Okla. 1967); Hay-
wood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 299, 400 P.2d 16 (1965).
99. The theory which awarded the account balance to the sur-
vivor as beneficiary of an implied trust has now been discarded in all
states. See Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Mud-
dle, supra note 81, at 385. A strong argument, however, can be made
for this discredited rationale. See generally Wellman, The Joint and
Survivor Account in Michigan-Progress Through Confusion, 63 MIcH.
L. REv. 629, 661-64 (1965).
100. See Alaimo v. First Nat'l Bank of Thompsonville, 24 Conn.
Supp. 369, 190 A.2d 924 (1963); Brennen v. Timmins, 104 N.H. 384, 187
A.2d 793 (1963); In re Paris' Estate, 32 Misc. 2d 1043, 223 N.Y.S.2d 569(1961); In re Webb's Estate, 49 Wash. 2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
101. See Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834 (1948);
Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947). See generally
Wellman, supra note 99, at 656-61.
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standard joint account agreement, which includes a survivorship
right. Such an arrangement is clearly inconsistent with the intent
of the principal depositor. If the principal depositor dies first,
extrinsic proof should be admissible to rebut the survivorship
language in the deposit agreement. Among courts eager to en-
force survivorship rights in accounts, there is a danger that
such evidence will not be admitted or will not be found suffi-
ciently persuasive in the face of contrary assertions by the sur-
vivor.
02
Many courts, however, do recognize an exception based on
a confidential relationship, and place on the survivor the burden
of proving that the survivorship form was a result of the de-
cedent's own free will.0 3  If he cannot sustain the burden of
proof, a constructive trust is enforced for the benefit of the de-
cedent's estate. T0 This approach, however, creates the ironic
result that the more distant the relationship of the survivor to
the deceased co-owner, the more likely the survivorship will be
upheld.
The difficulty the courts have had with joint accounts can
be traced primarily to the insistence on forcing an essentially
novel ownership arrangement into the mold of an existing set
of legal principles. The joint account is fundamentally neither
a common law joint tenancy, an ordinary inter vivos gift, a trust
nor a will, yet it partakes of the features of all of these. 0 5
The main fault of the contract theory in such instances is
that it is premised on a fictitious analysis of intent. The typical
donor co-owner who opens a survivorship account is not thinking
about a contract with the donee concerning a survivorship right.
What he does intend is a gift of a survivorship right, albeit a
revocable and tenuous gift. The deposit contract with the
financial institution is merely the means by which the gift intent
is carried out. Slavish concentration by the courts on the written
agreement of deposit diverts attention from this basic donative
intent.
102. See, e.g., Kilfoy v. Fritz, 125 Cal. App. 2d 291, 270 P.2d 579
(1954); Maahs v. Maahs, 307 Mich. 549, 12 N.W.2d 335 (1943); Lau v. Lau,
304 Mich. 218, 7 N.W.2d 278 (1943); Meigs v. Thayer, 289 Mich. 680, 287
N.W. 342 (1939).
103. See McGahee v. Walden, 216 Ga. 352, 116 S.E.2d 559 (1960);
Childs v. Shepard, 213 Ga. 381, 99 S.E.2d 129 (1957); In re Estate of
Svab, 8 Ohio App. 2d 80, 220 N.E.2d 720 (1966).
104. See Swofford v. Swofford, 327 Ill. App. 55, 63 N.E.2d 615 (1945).
105. For an excellent discussion of the similarities and differences,
see Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, supra note 81.
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In addition to the fictitious analysis of intent, the contract
theory can be faulted inasmuch as it carries with it application of
rules from the entire body of contiact law, including the rigid
rules of contract interpretation.10 6 For example, invocation of
the parol evidence rule often excludes evidence of the parties' in-
tent.107 On the other hand, contract jurisdictions are not sad-
dled with the incomplete gift problem. Some courts which eval-
uate joint accounts by conventional property law standards have
held that the intended gift is defective because the donee did not
receive a vested present interest in amy portion of the account. 08
The results in cases where the donor co-owner changes his intent
during his lifetime tend to support. this analysis of the incom-
pleteness of the gift.!0 9
If it were essential to justify the joint account as constituting
a completed gift, it could be argued. that a present interest does
pass on creation of the account. The interest involved is the
right to receive the account on the occurrence of a future con-
tingency-the donor co-owner's prior death at a time when the
account had neither been closed nor its terms altered in such a
way as to eliminate the donee co-owner's right. The concept of
a present right in a contingent future interest is not unknown in
property jurisprudence." 0 This attenuated gift analysis stretches
the law only slightly more than the fictional contract analysis
strains the facts.
A much more satisfactory resolution of the joint account
problem would be frank recognition of the joint account as a
valid and somewhat special ownership form, a result already
reached in several states, including Minnesota."' If the courts
106. See Alaimo v. First Nat'l Bank of Thompsonville, 24 Conn.
Supp. 369, 190 A.2d 924 (1963); In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93,
148 N.W.2d 468 (1967); Shipman v. Hance, 109 Ohio App. 321, 165 N.E.2d
678 (1959); In re Amour's Estate, 397 Pa. 262, 154 A.2d 502 (1959);
Barbour v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank of Watertown, 77 S.D. 106, 86
N.W.2d 526 (1957).
107. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148 N.W.2d 468(1967).
108. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953); In re
Sivak's Estate, 409 Pa. 261, 185 A.2d 778 (1962); In re Fox's Estate, 16
Pa. D. & C.2d 425 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1.959); Balfour's Estate v. Seitz,
392 Pa. 300, 140 A.2d 441 (1958).
109. See cases cited notes 116-18, infra.
110. See Blodgett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 111 Conn. 165,
149 A. 790 (1930); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600
(1955).
111. See Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451 (1958).
See also Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank of Minneapolis, 179
[Vol. 54t:509
1970] PERSONAL PROPERTY JOINT TENANCIES 533
are not ready to sustain the joint account independent of con-
ventional property or contract formulas, legislative sanction
should be sought.
B. CONSEQUENCES
Although difficulties in the creation of joint and survivor
co-ownerships are more frequent and attract more attention, the
rights and duties arising between the co-owners as a consequence
of having created a joint tenancy, and the implications of the
relationship to interested third parties, also offer many puzzling
problems. One set of questions concerns the interests in the
jointly owned property while the co-owners are alive. A second
group of problems arise when one of the co-owners dies and
the effects of the survivorship right must be determined.
1. Interests During the Life of the Co-owners
(a) Possession and Control
Conventional joint tenancy doctrine teaches that each co-
tenant has an equal right to possess and derive benefits from
the property." 2 As to tangible items of personal property, such
as automobiles and livestock, this learning is still quite satis-
factory.113 As applied to the majority of co-ownerships in in-
tangibles, however, the doctrine is clearly inappropriate. For
example, a co-owner whose name appears on a joint and survivor
account by the grace of another person ordinarily cannot com-
pel a sharing in the account during the other's lifetime." 4 If
he makes withdrawals contrary to the intention of the co-owner
who furnished the consideration, he can be required to reim-
burse the account." 5 The disingenuousness of attempting to
Minn. 430, 229 N.W. 865 (1930); In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So.
2d 20 (1943); Slocum v. Bohuslov, 164 Neb. 156, 82 N.W.2d 39 (1957);
In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 119, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).
112. 2 A.nmacAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Ma-
mer, Legal Consequences of Joint Ownership, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 944.
113. See In re Ebdon, 98 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sur. Ct. 1950) (offspring of
livestock held in joint tenancy are also jointly held).
114. See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, supra
note 81, at 615, 625, 632; Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank
Account Muddle, supra note 81; Nowicki v. Nowicki, 335 Mass. 392, 140
N.E.2d 175 (1957); Jacques v. Jacques, 352 Mich. 127, 89 N.W.2d 451
(1958). Cf. In re Estate of Gray, 27 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965).
115. See Hagen v. Elmendorf, 365 Mich. 624, 113 N.W.2d 892
(1962); Allstaedt v. Ochs, 302 Mich. 232, 4 N.W.2d 530 (1942); Stanger
v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955).
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pass off joint and survivor accounts as effective inter vivos gifts
is obvious, for the contributing co-owner can terminate the oth-
er's interest in the account by striking the other's name from
the agreement, 116 by substituting another co-owner," 7 or by
simply closing the account." 8 Similar rules are applied to gov-
ernment bonds." 9
Corporate securities and contract rights held in survivor
form present a somewhat different case, since these interests can
more easily be the object of "completed gifts." Thus, it is gen-
erally held that unless the contributing co-owner can establish the
absence of a gift, the donee co-owner can compel the surrender




From time to time the "right to control" issue is raised
where one of the parties is the guardian of a co-owner. Where
the guardian represents the donee co-owner, the results out-
lined above are not changed. 22 However, where the donor
co-owner is incompetent, the guardian is usually not granted
the same unlimited discretion to terminate the donee's interest
by destroying the co-ownership. His power to remove property
from the co-ownership arrangement is limited to the perform-
ance of his fiduciary duties to make adequate provision for the
donor-ward.us
116. Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957).
117. Medeiros v. Cotta, 134 Cal. App. 2d 452, 286 P.2d 546 (1955).
118. In re Estate of Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963). The
court stated in its syllabus of the case:
6. Where there is a joint tenancy created in a bank account and
one joint tenant withdraws the whole or a part thereof, with
or without the consent of the other joint tenant, and the char-
acter of the funds withdrawn is thus changed, there has been
a severance of the joint tenancy as to the fund withdrawn and
an extinguishment of the right of survivorship as to such
funds.
Id. at 883, 125 N.W.2d at 70. See also Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300,
84 N.W.2d 87 (1957).
119. See Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870 (1951); In re
Chittock's Estate, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 432, 47 Ohio Op. 226, 106 N.E.2d 320
(P. Ct. 1952).
120. See, e.g., Crook v. Crook, 185 Cal. App. 2d 745, 7 Cal. Rptr.
892 (1960).
121. See, e.g., Lowry v. Magnolia Elev. Co., 273 Ala. 94, 134 So. 2d
760 (1961); Mamer, supra note 112, at 946-48.
122. Childs v. Shepard, 213 Ga. 381, 99 S.E.2d 129 (1957); Toomey
v. Moore, 213 Ore. 422, 325 P.2d 805 (1958).
123. Howard v. Imes, 265 Ala. 298, 90 So. 2d 818 (1956); Boehmer
v. Boehmer, 264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W.2d 411 (1953).
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(b) Income, Profits and Expenses
The rules governing the allocation of gains and expenses of
jointly held personalty closely parallel the law on possession and
control. Where the contributing co-owner has complete control
over the co-ownership property, he is not required to account
to the other co-owner for any gains realized.124 On the other
hand, where the co-ownership has resulted in a completed gift
to the donee co-owner, the donee is entitled to share in income
or profits and may compel an accounting to secure this right.125
One troublesome problem that may arise in cases where one
co-owner is seeking to recover the gains from the property is
the determination of the extent of interest of the respective par-
ties.120  This issue is more commonly raised when a creditor
seeks to assert a claim against the property; since the same
standards should be utilized in each case, its discussion will
await the consideration given to creditors' rights below.
A proportionate share of expenses incurred by one co-owner
in the reasonable management and preservation of the jointly
owned property may be claimed against the other co-owner.127
Some jurisdictions do not recognize such a claim as giving rise
to a personal action against the noncontributing co-tenant; in-
stead, the expenses may only be set off against the other's
profits; if no profits are realized, the claim may constitute a lien
against the property. 28 In an arrangement where one co-own-
er's position is too tenuous to permit him to assert a present
interest in either the property or the profits therefrom, it is
unlikely that a claim for expenses would be allowed.
(c) Creditors
All states grant a creditor the power to garnish or levy ex-
ecution on his debtor's interest in personal property held in
joint tenancy1 9 It is a well-established principle, however, that
124. See Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957).
125. Id.
126. See Leaf v. McGowan, 13 M. App. 2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67
(1957). Cf. Jezo v. Jezo, 23 Wis. 2d 399, 127 N.W.2d 246 (1964); Well-
man, supra note 99, at 641-42.
127. Cf. Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. Ct.
1962).
128. See Mamer, supra note 112, at 948.
129. See Murphy, Cotenancies: A Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L.
REV. 405, 408 (1962). However, most state laws generally provide for
significant exemptions of personal property from execution. See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANx. §§ 627.6-627.7 (1950); MInqN. STAT. § 550.37 (1967);
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a creditor's rights to apply property to the satisfaction of his
claim can rise no higher than the debtor's own interest in the
property.130 If the creditor has a claim against fewer than all
of the co-owners, a determination of the parties' respective own-
ership interests is required. The question is whether the inter-
est of the debtor is to be determined by his apparent proportion-
ate ownership of the property, by his contributions to the co-
ownership, or by some other criterion, such as whether a com-
pleted gift has occurred. 131 Different rules and presumptions
are applied by the several states. A few courts hold that the
creditor is entitled to reach the entire account, except to the ex-
tent that nondebtor co-owners can establish a contribution on
their part.132  Other courts require the creditor to prove his
debtor's contributions. 83 In most states, however, there is a
presumption that the debtor owns a proportionate share of the
account; either the creditor or the other co-owners can offer
proof to rebut the presumption. 3 4
It seems unfair to permit a debtor to place assets beyond
the reach of a creditor merely by selecting a particular form of
ownership. For this reason, any approach should tie the debtor's
interest to his contributions; in ad.dition, creditors' reliance on
the apparent proportionate ownership should be protected by
creating a presumption of equal ownership in the absence of
satisfactory proof of contributions. Several legislatures have
adopted this approach. 3 5
WASH. REV. CODE AiN. § 616.020 (Supp. 1967). These statutes exempt
such important items as automobiles, household furniture and a lim-
ited amount of livestock.
130. See Murphy, supra note 129, at 408; Treadwell & Shulkin,
Joint Tenancy-Creditor-Debtor Relations, 37 WASH. L. Rxv. 58, 64
(1962). Tenancy by the entirety ownership is subject to different rules
respecting creditors in some jurisdictions, so care should be used in seg-
regating joint tenancy cases. See Huber, Creditor's Rights in Tenancies
by the Entireties, 1 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 197 (1960).
131. See generally Murphy, supra note 129; Wellman, supra note 99,
at 641, 654; Mamer, supra note 112, at 960; Note, The Right of the
Individual Creditor Against the Joint and Survivorship Bank Account,
42 IowA L. REV. 551, 553-55 (1957).
132. See, e.g., Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d
194 (1951) (even though the joint account consisted of contributions
from both husband and wife co-owners).
133. See, e.g., Esposito v. Palovick- 29 N.J. Super. 3, 101 A.2d 568
(1953).
134. See, e.g., Sussex v. Snyder, 307 Mich. 30, 11 N.W.2d 314 (1943);
Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N.W. 698 (1922);
Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A. 890 (1932).
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (1965); N.C. Gmf. S.AT. § 41-2.1
(1966); S.D. LAws ch. 198 (1969).
[Vol. 54:509
1970] PERSONAL PROPERTY JOINT TENANCIES 537
The bankruptcy of a co-owner affects the ability of creditors
to reach jointly owned assets somewhat differently. The trustee
in bankruptcy is empowered to apply to the bankrupt's debts all
property which the bankrupt could have transferred by any
means. 136 Therefore, an issue important to both the trustee
and the other co-owners is whether the bankrupt had any in-
terest in the property which he could have asserted through
withdrawals or sale.137 Where the bankrupt has made no con-
tribution to the co-ownership, the other co-owner should be
permitted to prove that no completed gift of a present right in
the property took place.
(d) Taxation
(1) Gift Tax
The creation of a joint tenancy gives rise to a possible gift
tax whenever the co-ownership arrangement results in a com-
pleted gift.188 Thus, gratuitous creation of co-ownership in tan-
gible items of personalty and in intangibles respresented by title
documents is normally a taxable event since the donee is
granted an immediate fractional interest in the property.189 Con-
trary to common understanding, this is true regardless of the
relationship of the co-owners. Where the subject of the gift is
personal property, only the extent of the gift that is taxable is
affected by the joint tenant's marital relationship.140
Where the nature of the co-ownership is one in which the
donee co-owner is granted no immediate right to claim any of
the property, the creation of the co-ownership is not a taxable
event.141 If the donee is permitted to and does claim ownership
136. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
137. See Simon v. Schaetzel, 189 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951).
[T]here is an underlying concept that, for any property or right
not listed in the special clauses to pass to the bankruptcy trustee,
it must have the characteristic of being transferable or leviable.
This depends upon local law, and the law applicable has usu-
ally been considered to be that of the state in which the prop-
erty or property right is located.
3 H. REnmvGTON, BnupTCY LAW § 1178 (6th ed. 1957).
138. IqT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2511(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 25:2511-1
(h) (4) & (5) (1958).
139. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(a), (c), (h) (5) (1958). Cf. Treas. Reg.
§§ 25.2503-4(c) (1958); See also Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269
(3d Cir. 1939).
140. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2523; Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2523(a)-l(a),
(b) (ii) (1958).
141. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2 (b) & (c) (1958); Burnet v. Guggen-
heim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933). See also Kahn, Joint Tenancies and Tenancies
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of any part of the co-ownership property during the lifetime of
the donor, a tax may be levied on the extent of the property con-
verted to the donee's use.142  Thus, the gratuitous creation of
the typical joint account or co-ownership in government
bonds143 does not result in an immediate gift tax liability be-
cause the gift is regarded as incomplete. The gift tax is, how-
ever, imposed whenever the donee acquires a serverable and
irrevocable interest in the property, such as he would by with-
drawing funds from the joint account or by cashing the bond.
A number of jurisdictions impose a state gift tax on gratui-
tous transfers. Under most of these laws, the handling of gifts
involving joint tenancies closely parallels the federal provi-
sions.14 4
(2) Income Tax
Under both state 45 and federal law 4 6 the income from
jointly owned property is taxed to the co-owners in equal shares
whenever the co-ownership arrangement has created fixed frac-
tional interests in the property, even though the parties may
by the Entirety in Michigan-Federal Gift Tax Considerations, 66 MICH.
L. REv. 431, 433 (1968); Young, Tax Incidents of Joint Ownership, 1959
U. ILL. L.F. 972, 978; Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22
TAX LAw. 601, 614 (1969).
142. Treas. Reg. § 2511-1(h) (4) (1958); See also C. LOWNDES & R.
KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIT TAXEs 666 (2d ed. 1962):
Of course, even the withdrawal of more than he has deposited
in a joint bank account will not be a taxable gift to the person
making the withdrawal from the other depositor unless a di-
rect payment of the amount of the withdrawal would have
been a gift. Thus, for example, if H deposits money in a joint
account for himself and his wife, W, and W withdraws amounts
from the account to pay for household expenses, the with-
drawal will not constitute a gift from H to W, because a direct
advance from H to W to pay household expenses would not
be a taxable gift.
143. Treas Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958).
144. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 15104, 15104.5 (West Supp.
1968); Calif. Regs. Relating to the Gift Tax Law § 15104(e), CCH INI.
EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 2716; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-4-6 (1963);
InwN. STAT. § 292.01(3) (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1041(b) (1961);
Effland, Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 507, 535.
145. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 422.7 (Supp. 1969); Effland, supra
note 144, at 536.
146. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61a. If local law allows the joint
tenancy arrangement with respect to ownership of property and thereby
recognizes as one of the incidents of that arrangement that each co-
owner has a right to share in the property and the income therefrom,
then a proportionate amount of the income will be charged to each
owner. See Frederick J. Haynes, 7 B.T.A. 465 (1927).
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have made disproportionate contributions 147 and even though
one co-owner receives all of the income.
148
The federal income tax provisions, like the gift tax provi-
sions, impose a tax only on the donor co-owner if the co-owner-
ship arrangement does not result in a completed gift. Thus,
the donor of a joint account or a government savings bond
who maintains complete control over the property is fully taxed
on the interest income.1 49 In the case of a government bond
where the owner is permitted to defer recognition of interest
income until the bond is surrendered,1 50 an assignment of in-
come issue is raised where the gift is subsequently completed
by allowing the donee co-owner to cash the bond and retain the
proceeds. Under the Horst'51 doctrine, the donor is required
to report income in the amount of the increment in value of the
bond in the year it is surrendered.
1 52
Expense deductions arising from income producing joint ten-
ancies are apparently totally deductible by the co-owner actually
making the payment.153 This anomalous "payment rule" has
thus far been applied only to payments of property taxes and
mortgage interest in husband and wife joint tenancies.5 4 Com-
mentators suggest that because the rule is inconsistent with local
147. James R. Baer, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 520 (1952); Frederick
J. Haynes, 7 B.T.A. 465 (1927); Rev. Rul. 23-12441, 1946-2 Cum. BULL.
51. The equal sharing policy makes joint tenancy a possible technique
for achieving some income shifting where the co-owners are other than
husband and wife. See Young, supra note 141, at 989-91.
148. See Morgan v. Finnegan, 182 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1950).
149. Rev. Rul. 143, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 12.
150. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 454(c).
151. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
152. See Rev. Rul. 55-278, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 471.
Series E United States savings bonds registered in the names of
A and B in the alternative as coowners, which A had pur-
chased in 1948 entirely with his own funds, were reissued in
1953 in the name of B alone in order to effect a gift to him of
A's coownership therein. Held, . . . (2) the interest (incre-
ment in value) that had accrued (as earned) on the bonds
before their reissue is all includible in A's gross income, for
Federal income tax purposes, for his taxable year or period
wherein he made such gift, except such interest as he has
properly returned as income previously.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b), T.D. 6593, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 23;
Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1(a), T.D. 6780, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 98.
153. F.C. Nicodemus, Jr., 26 B.T.A. 125 (1932).
154. See Oren C. White, 18 T.C. 385 (1952) where the Tax Court
refused to extend the "payment rule" to general operating expenses of
a farm held in tenancy by the entirety. Although H paid all the ex-
penses he was only allowed to deduct one-half of the operating loss;
W was entitled to the other one-half.
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property law and with the approach taken in taxing income from
joint tenancy property, it is unlikely to be extended beyond the
husband and wife co-ownership. It should be noted that in the
husband and wife situation, the joint filing option renders this
rule relatively harmless. 55
2. After Death: The Effects of Survivorship
(a) Special Claimants
The earlier treatment of creation problems dealt extensively
with the enforceability of the survivorship right against takers
in the estate of the decedent co-ovner. One principle noted was
that if the survivorship arrangement is valid, the survivor's
claim to the property takes precedence over the decedent's heirs
and ordinary will beneficiaries. It is also well settled that a
co-owner cannot destroy the survivorship right by will.156 Not
so clear, however, is the vulnerability of the survivor's right to
claims made by those with special standing to challenge the sur-
vivorship. Special claimants include the decedent's surviving
spouse, the beneficiary under a contractual will, and state or
federal governments. In addition, the estate representative who
seeks to apply the joint tenancy property to estate debts and
charges might also be considered a special claimant; this matter,
however, will be covered in the discussion of the rights of cred-
itors.
(b) Surviving Spouse
In nearly every state a surviving spouse has special status
to challenge the decedent's disposition at death. 57 Nevertheless,
155. See Young, supra note 141, at 9:38.
156. Reichelderfer, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 1959 U. ILL. L.F.
932, 933-34; Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Mn.
L. REV. 466, 469 (1954).
157. A power to elect against the spouse's will is the most common.
See 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNInG, WILLs, TausTs 11 2735; Hines, Freedom of
Testation and the Iowa Probate Code, 49) IowA L. REV. 724 (1964). Some
states permit a separate challenge of testamentary gifts to charity. See
1 P-H ESTATE PLANNING, WILLs, Tausm f 1020; Rees, American Wills
Statutes, 46 VA. L. REV. 856, 867 (1960). Many states grant the surviving
spouse the right to continued possession of the family homestead. See
2 P-H ESTATE PLANNnG, WLs, TRusrs f 2734. Many states also pro-
vide for an allowance from the estate to the surviving spouse. See T.
ATKINSON, WiLs 128-29 (2d ed. 1953); 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNING, WILLS,
TRusTs 1 2734. An inter vivos transfer intended to defeat spousal rights
may be set aside on grounds of fraud. See Davis v. Davis, 98 So. 2d 777
(Fla. 1957); Dorrough v. Grove, 257 Ala. 609, 60 So. 2d 342 (1952). In
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survivorship arrangements are generally held effective to defeat
spousal rights. 58 The decisions are usually premised on an inter
vivos gift analysis. The rule even extends to joint bank account
situations where the absence of a completed gift is recognized
in disputes over the co-owner's rights inter vivos.159 This result
in joint tenancy cases is, however, consistent with the treatment
afforded other probate avoidance techniques such as revocable
and Totten trusts.160
The current posture of the law thus appears to present a
classic illustration of form triumphing over substance. Refusing
to allow spousal claims to pierce such will substitutes permits a
married property owner to enjoy the benefits of his property up
to his death and yet deprive his spouse of an interest in property
after his death. In states following a nonapportionment rule
for payment of estate taxes,1'6 employment of probate avoid-
ance techniques may further reduce the share of the surviving
spouse by increasing the taxes which must be paid by the estate.
The majority position is at odds with the generally protective
policy of the law toward the surviving spouse; indeed some
commentators observe a trend in recent decisions toward sub-
many jurisdictions all real estate transfers require the consent of the
transferor's spouse to avoid the possible assertion of special spousal
rights. See 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNG, WILLS, TRUSTS 2731.
158. See, e.g., Laterza v. Murray, 2 Ill. 2d 219, 117 N.E.2d 779
(1954); Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 39 S.E.2d 299 (1946).
159. See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72, 75
(1954), quoting Ragan v. Kelly, 180 Md. 324, 330-31, 24 A.2d 289, 293
(1942): "In any particular case the question whether a trust in law
has been created effectually to vest the fund in the survivor depends
entirely upon the actual intention of the original owner of the fund at
the time he had the entry in the bankbook made."
See also In re Prokaskey's Will, 109 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sur. Ct. 1951) at
891, citing In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904): "It
is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or
completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration,
such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary."
160. See DeLeul's Executors v. DeLeuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 SW.2d 474
(1934); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570,
161 A. 721 (1932). To the contrary are cases involving revocable inter
vivos trusts which hold that the surviving spouse of the settlor can reach
or take into account the trust property for purposes of satisfying marital
rights. See Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 IM. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75
(1944); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945); Mac-
Gregor v. Fox, 280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1952), afi'd, 305
N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953). See also cases collected in 1 A. CASNER,
ESTATEL iANG 114 n.18 (3d ed. 1961).
161. See, e.g., IowA CODE A!mN. § 633.449 (Supp. 1969). See also
CCH IN. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 2030.
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jecting probate avoidance schemes to spousal claims.162
In Pennsylvania and New York, the legislatures have inter-
vened to ameliorate the plight of the surviving spouse. 0 8 In
both states a surviving spouse is allowed to treat as a testa-
mentary disposition transfers in which the deceased retained a
power to revoke. Only the New York statute, however, spe-
cifically covers joint tenancies. The Uniform Probate Code may
lend further impetus to reform movements through its use of an
"augmented estate" concept in relation to the rights of a sur-
viving spouse.164
If the surviving spouse is to be permitted to reach property
transferred through will substitutes, joint tenancy property
should be included. A tactical question arises, however, con-
cerning how this should be accomplished. Should joint tenancy
law include provisions subjecting jointly owned assets to the
rights of a surviving spouse or should the spousal rights issue
be dealt with in a separate statute designed to reach all probate
avoidance techniques?16 5 Although there is some force in the
argument that change must start somewhere and might just as
well be introduced in the course of joint tenancy reform, it
seems that such a shift should be comprehensively made, and
not done piecemeal among the various will substitute techniques.
A piecemeal approach could produce an undesirable situation in
which the devious property owner could defeat his spouse's in-
terest simply by keeping one jump ahead of reform efforts.
162. See 1 A. SCoTT, TRUSTS § 58.5 (3d ed. 1967). See also RESTATE-
mENT (SEcOND) Or TRusTs § 58, comment (e) (1959). The inherent
conflict between policies of free alienation of property and protec-
tion of the surviving spouse have fascinated a number of legal scholars
and have made the subjection of probate avoidance schemes to defeat
spousal rights a controversial issue. See, e.g., Plager, The Spouse's
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. Cmr. L.
REv. 681 (1966); Scoles, Conflict of Law's and Nonbarrable Interests in
Administration of Decendent's Estates, E U. FLA. L. REv. 151 (1955).
163. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon Supp. 1969); N.Y. Es-
TATE, PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
164. UIFomv PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (Working Draft No. 5, 1968).
Under the provisions of the Uniform Code, a surviving spouse has a
right to elect a one-third interest in the agumented estate, which in-
cludes (1) lifetime transfers by the decedent in which the decedent re-
tained a life interest in the property transferred or a general power of
appointment and to which the survivor did not consent; (2) transfers
creating joint tenancies and (3) gifts of more than $3,000 per year for
the two years prior to death.
165. See generally Wellman, The Joint and Survivor Account in
Michigan-Progress Through Confusion, 63 MIc H. L. Rnv. 629, 664
(1965).
[Vol. 54:509
19703 PERSONAL PROPERTY JOINT TENANCIES 543
(c) Contractual Will
One situation requiring a determination of the effect of joint
tenancy on the operation of a contractual will is where the par-
ties to the joint will are co-owners of some of their property with
right of survivorship. Does the contractual will restrict the sur-
vivor's power to freely transfer the joint tenancy property?
Classic joint tenancy theory suggests it does not.166 This issue
is often of primary importance in reckoning the taxability of
the transfers.1 7
A second situation in which joint tenancy ownership raises
a possible conflict with a contractual will is where the deceased
co-owner was the surviving party to an earlier contractual will
which bound him in the testamentary disposition of his estate.
The question here is whether the interest taken by the surviv-
ing co-owner is derived through a testamentary transfer in
breach of the requirements of the contractual will.
Most of the cases concern joint and survivor accounts. Con-
sistent with the general policy toward such accounts, it is regu-
larly held that the surviving co-owner receives his interest
through an inter vivos gift and not through a testamentary
transfer. 68 Again it requires some ingenuity for the courts to
square their gift rationale in these cases with the contrary re-
sults in inter vivos disputes between co-owners. Typically, the
transfer by gift is characterized as having been incomplete dur-
ing the donor's life but vesting in complete ownership at his
death. 69
(d) Government Claims
Government liens are often made applicable to all of the
debtors' property. Co-ownership property can be subjected to
a lien growing out of a claim against one of the co-owners, 170
but these liens usually must be filed to be enforceable against
166. See generally Effland, supra note 144; Note, Joint Tenancies
and Wills, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 1043.
167. See United States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1967); Awtry v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955).
168. See McLean v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Mich.
1963). Cf. In re Quinn, 23 App. Div. 2d 548, 256 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965);
Little v. Cunningham, 381 P.2d 144 (Okla. 1963).
169. See In re Prokaskey's Will, 109 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (Sur. Ct.
1951).
170. See generally Swenson & Degnan, supra note 151, at 493; King,
Federal Tax Liens and Jointly Owned Property, 46 TAXEs 7, 8 (1968).
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bona fide purchasers of the property.17 ' However, even without
a special filing, such statutory liens may be enforceable against a
gratuitous transferee.17 2  The question then is whether the in-
terest of the surviving joint tenant can be subjected to general
statutory liens based on governmental claims against the deceased
co-owner.
One type of lien which has been asserted against the sur-
vivor arises under the provisions of state old-age and assistance
laws. Such laws often grant the state a claim which can be
asserted against all property owned by the individual receiving
assistance.'7 Two issues are raised by the state's attempt to
assert the lien against property in -the hands of a surviving joint
tenant. First, is the joint tenancy relationship severed by the
imposition of the lien? It is generally held that the survivorship
right is not affected.17 4 Second, assuming no severance, is the lien
enforceable against the joint tenancy property in the hands of the
survivor? Except for an analogy to an unfortunate doctrine in
the law of real estate joint tenancies, 75 no good argument can be
offered for freeing the property from a valid lien. 7 0 Liens arising
as the result of the decedent co-owmer's failure to pay his taxes
are the major threat to the tranquility of the survivor's owner-
ship. Both federal 77 and state 7 8 tax laws create liens against
the property of a delinquent taxpayer. It has never been seri-
171. See INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6323 (a),
172. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6323-:L(a) & 2(a): "The term 'pur-
chaser' means a person who, for a valuable consideration, acquires prop-
erty or an interest in property."
173. See IowA CODE ANN. §§ 249..9 & 249.20 (1969); Mr'&. STAT.
§ 256.26(6) (1967).
174. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.26(5) (1957); Weaver v. New Bedford,
335 Mass. 644, 140 N.E.2d 309 (1957); Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235,
41 N.W.2d 444 (1950). But see ILL. Amw. STAT. § 3-10.8 (Smith-Hurd
1968) which provides for severance of the joint tenancy when the lien
is properly recorded. In Wisconsin, the court decided that a severance
occurred. In re Feiereisen's Estate, 263 Wis. 53, 56 N.W.2d 513 (1953).
A special statute was then enacted to restore the integrity of titles taken
through survivorship rights. Wis. STAT. AN. § 49.26 (5) (1957).
175. See text accompanying notes 180-82 infra.
176. The meager authority which exists, however, follows the
common law doctrine that a mere charge or burden on the interest of a
joint tenant does not effect a severance and holds that the lien dies with
the expiration of the deceased's interest. See note 174 supra.
177. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321. The lien is on "all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person." See generally W. PnuMB & L. WRiGHT, F-DERAL TAX LMNs 33
(Taxation Practice Handbook No. 4, ALI' 1967).
178. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANn. § 698 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IowA
CODE ANN. § 422.26 (1949); NEB. RE .ST, §§ 77-203, 77-205 (1958).
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ously argued that such liens automatically sever the joint ten-
ancy, but attempts have been made to assert them against prop-
erty passing under a survivorship arrangement. In the few
cases reported, the federal government has been unsuccessful in
reaching the property in the hands of the survivor179 While
the results have been justified in terms of the technicalities of
the statute under which the lien was created, it is difficult to
justify permitting the survivorship right to insulate the property
from the enforcement of claims for decedent's unpaid taxes.
(e) Creditors
The general rule regarding the secured creditor who has
not initiated enforcement of his lien prior to death seems to be
that his lien dies with the debtor. 80 The technical basis for
this result is found in the ancient tenet that each joint tenant's
interest is "per tout.' 8'l Reliance on this concept is usually jus-
tified as consistent with the general policy of holding creditors
to a high standard of diligence. 82 This rationale partially sup-
ports denying the claim of the chattel mortgagee who neglected
to obtain binding obligations from all co-owners, but it certainly
does not justify denying relief for the creditor whose lien arises
by statute. As noted in the prior section, it is difficult to per-
ceive the social policy underlying a rule that denies the enforce-
ment of a lien simply because the decedent to whose property
the lien attached happened to be a joint tenant.
The unsecured creditor of a joint tenant who relies on co-
ownership assets to satisfy his claim is also well advised to pray
for the debtor's continued good health. Through application of
179. In cases involving transferee liability where no lien had
arisen before death, it has been held that the decedent's interest is ex-
tinguished rather than "transferred" to the survivor. Tooley v. Com-
missioner, 121 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1941); Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1938); Fercurotta v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 592 (D.C. Ariz.
1956).
180. See Swenson & Degnan, supra note 156, at 493; Treadwell &
Shulkin, supra note 130, at 59-63.
181. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, has explained this
concept as follows: "In a legal sense, his death does not transfer the
rights that he possessed in the property to the surviving tenant. Death
does not enlarge the estate. Death terminates his interest in the estate.
It is rather a falling away of the tenant from the estate than the passing
of the estate to others." Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 88, 89, 174
N.W. 946, 953 (1919).
182. See, e.g., People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858
(1958); Ziegler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942). Cf.
Peoples Trust & Say. Bank v. Haas, 328 fll. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (1927); Musa
v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the joint tenancy notion of ownership by the whole 183 or
through adoption of a completed gift analysis,184 courts have
consistently denied creditors the right to garnish or levy execu-
tion on joint tenancy property in the hands of the survivor,
except in situations where the original creation of the joint ten-
ancy constituted a transfer in fraud of creditors. 8 5
The creditor's uncomfortable situation is further aggravated
by the procedural lengths to which he must go to sever the
joint tenancy. It is well settled that attachment of the property
does not cause severance.8 6 Similarly, the institution of suit,
the obtaining of a personal judgment,18 7 garnishment or a levy
of execution do not result in a severance. 8 8 In most states the
effective event is the execution sale of the joint owner's inter-
est.1
89
Several states have enacted legislation designed to relieve
the creditor's plight. Some statutes do no more than specify
the point in the collection process at which a severance occurs.190
183. Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N.W. 613 (1914); see cases
cited note 182 supra.
184. Hughes v. Fairfield Lumber 8: Supply Co., 143 Conn. 427, 123
A.2d 195 (1956); DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).
But see In re Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783
(1967).
185. Courts generally refuse to acceapt the argument that where thejoint tenant is insolvent at death the survivor's interest arises as the
result of a transfer in fraud of creditors. The common law notion of
each owner's interest being in the whole of the property is the com-
mon ground for rejecting this fraudulent conveyance analysis. See
DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956) (conveyance intojoint tenancy not fraudulent when debts were incurred four years
later). Contra, In re Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.
2d 783 (1967) (survivor's interest in a mutual fund account was taken
in fraud of creditors where the other joint tenant died insolvent).
186. New Haven Trolley & Bus Employees Credit Union v. Hill,
145 Conn. 332, 142 A.2d 730, 733 (1958). See Wilson v. Kelso, 250 Iowa
67, 92 N.W.2d 392 (1958); First Nat'l Bank of Linn Grove v. Kindwall,
201 Iowa 82, 206 N.W. 241 (1925).
187. Peoples Trust & Say. Bank v. Haas, 328 IM. 468, 160 N.E. 85(1927); Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657
(1937).
188. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945). Con-
tra, Sussex v. Snyder, 307 Mich. 30, 11 N.W.2d 314 (1943); Dover Trust
Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A. 890 (1932).
189. New Haven Trolley & Bus Employees Credit Union v. Hill,
145 Conn. 332, 142 A.2d 730 (1958); Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41
N.W.2d 444 (1950); see also Annot. 16. A.L.R. 1139, 1140 n.1 (1946); 2
AMmucA LAW or PRaoaRTY § 6.2, at 10 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
190. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (Supp. 1961); MAss. GEN.
LAws AxaN. ch. 236, § 12 (1959); O1-A. STAT. tit. 60, § 74 (1961).
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Others comprehensively revise and codify creditors' rights in
jointly owned property. 91 It is clear, however, that corrective
legislation is needed in states where the courts are bound up
in the thicket of common-law survivorship doctrine.
(f) Taxation 92
The federal estate tax law provides that all property owned
by a decedent as a joint tenant must be included in his gross
estate except to the extent it can be proved by the estate repre-
sentative that the survivor contributed to the co-ownership.' 93
The effect of the statutory language is to create a presumption
of total contribution by the decedent. 94 The burden of proving
the survivor's contributions is frequently a difficult task because
the Treasury has restrictively interpreted the question of what
constitutes an independent contribution 9 5 and because there
are practical evidentiary problems, such as the absence or incom-
pleteness of financial records.
Since most joint tenancies are between husband and wife,
the automatic qualification of joint tenancy transfers under the
marital deduction'9" means that the major estate tax difficulties
with joint tenancy arise on the death of the survivor. Excessive
use of joint tenancy frequently results in over-qualification for
the marital deduction which in turn leads to unnecessarily heavy
taxation on the transmission of the family wealth to the next
generation by the survivor, either by gift or at death.'97 This
danger constitutes the estate planner's primary quarrel with
191. CONN. Gmx. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-14(e), 47-14(f) (1959); NEs.
R v. STAT. § 30.624 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 41-2 (1963);
OiLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 74 (1961); S.D. CoMp. LAWS § 30-21A-1 (Supp.
1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.455 (Supp.
1969).
192. Because the subject of taxation on the death of a joint ten-
ant has been extensively treated in other writings, only the general out-
line of the tax laws will be presented here. For more detailed exposi-
tions, see Dean, Federal Tax Consequences of Joint Ownership, 53 GEO.
L.J. 863 (1965); Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact and
Fancy, 51 IowA L. REv. 582 (1966); Riecker, Joint Tenancy: The Estate
Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64 Mc. L. REv. 801 (1966); Effland, supra
note 144, at 529.
193. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040.
194. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (2).
195. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-3 (f).
196. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 2056 (e) (5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056
(e) (1) (a) (1).




At the state level, death taxation varies, though many states
closely follow the federal pattern.19 9 Thus, the threat of extra
taxation is repeated, although generally at a lower tax rate.
Other states treat joint tenancies the same as tenancies in com-
mon,20 0 thereby allowing the survivor to avoid both the diffi-
culties of proving contribution and. the danger of higher taxes.
A few states exclude joint tenancies from the coverage of their
death tax system.20 1  In these states joint tenancy offers the
advantage of avoiding local tax on the death of the first co-
owner.
It should be noted that both the federal estate tax and most
state death taxes contain provisions casting liability both on
the joint tenancy property and on the survivor. On the date
of the joint tenant's death a statutDry lien attaches to all prop-
erty subject to death taxation.20 2 Of more critical importance,
the federal estate tax law20 3 and most state death tax statutes204
impose personal liability for payment of death taxes on persons
taking property under a survivorship right. Thus, if the de-
ceased co-owner's probate estate is insolvent, the surviving joint
tenant is personally liable for death taxes attributable to the
property and the property is subject to a lien for the unpaid
taxes.
3. Reasons versus Consequences
To the extent a conscious choice is made, property owners
presumably select an ownership form because they intend to in-
cur the consequences associated with that form. Therefore, it
would seem a plausible hypothesis that one's reasons for select-
ing a particular ownership form are directly related to one's un-
198. See 1 A. CASNm, supra note 160, at 783; Riecker, supra note
192; Stacey, Joint Tenancy and Estate Planning, 37 WASH. L. REV. 44
(1962).
199. See CCH INH. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 1570.
200. See CCH INH. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. 1570; (Colo., Conn., Del.,
D.C., Ill., Ky., Me., Mont., Pa., [except husband and wife], S.D., Wis.).
201. See CCH INm EST. & GiFT TAx REP. 1570; (Alas., La., Md.,
Mich., Mo., Pa., [as to husband and wife joint tenancies, except those
created in contemplation of death], Vt. [husband and wife only], Wash.
[as to real property held in tenancy by the entirety], Wyo.).
202. IwT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a) (1).
203. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a) (1).
204. For the state provisions see CCH INH. EsT. & GIFT TAX REp.
2030.
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derstanding of the consequences of holding property in the man-
ner chosen.
To test this hypothesis, respondents in the field study were
asked why they selected specific ownership forms. The over-
whelming majority could recall no specific reason. To yield
more usable data, the matter could have been pressed somewhat
and the respondent offered a list of possible reasons to stimulate
his recall. In the pilot stage the interviewers did use this tech-
nique, but they reported that the interview was so extended
that its completion was jeopardized. For this reason, it was de-
cided not to pursue the reasons beyond asking the open-ended
question. The reasons reported and the frequency with which
they were offered are shown in Appendix XVIII. This table
shows that the three major factors cited for the selection of
joint tenancy were the nature of the family situation, ease of
transfer and reduction of death taxes. Although the first two
reasons are sound and considered among the classic advan-
tages of joint tenancy, the third reason is patently an invalid
ground for choosing joint tenancy. The frequency with which
this invalid reason is cited reinforces estate planners' complaints
that ordinary property owners lack an adequate awareness about
the effect of the ownership form.
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The foregoing analysis has highlighted a number of areas
in which legislative reform of joint tenancy law appears war-
ranted. In the following discussion, an attempt will be made
to draw these problem areas together and to suggest specific
corrective measures that seem justified by present patterns of
property ownership. These recommendations are presented in
outline form with accompanying explanatory comments.
A. AUTHORIZATION FOR JoINT TENANcY OwNERSHIP
iN ALL TYPES oF PROPERTY
The time has come to end the confusion and uncertainty so
commonly associated with the creation of joint tenancies. What
is required is a statute which recognizes the validity of joint
tenancy ownership of any type of real or personal property and
which spells out the requirements for creating a survivorship
right.
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1. Creation between Husband and: Wife: Joint Tenancy Pre-
sumed
Property rules should be designed to assure realization of
the intent of the ordinary property owner, not to protect against
the rare eccentric. The co-ownership of today almost always
involves a married couple.20 5  Reliable indicators show that
when a husband and wife own property together they intend
a survivorship arrangement in the overwhelming majority of
cases.206 There is no good reason why the law should insist on
a presumption against this intent. Therefore, it is recommended
that the legislature declare survivorship to be the preferred con-
struction in co-ownerships between spouses.
In according such joint tenancies favored treatment, the leg-
islation should provide for the proof of a contrary intent. Thus,
the present presumption in husband and wife co-ownerships
would be reversed. Presumably, the existing body of law con-
cerning the adequacy of evidence of intent would be relevant
in determining when the presumption of joint tenancy is re-
butted. A simple designation on the document of the parties
as "tenants in common" or "without right of survivorship"
should clearly suffice to overcome the presumption. One diffi-
culty not directly solved by this statutory approach is the owner-
ship of many types of tangible personalty where the issue is not
a choice between co-ownerships, but rather between single and
joint ownership. The legislature's sanction of husband-wife
joint tenancies would seem to provide a respectable policy basis
for resolving doubts in favor of co-ownership with survivorship.
It is realized that objections will be made to placing the leg-
islative imprimatur on joint tenancies. However, it seems that
husband and wife co-ownerships avoid the major dangers of
the joint tenancy form. Loss of control is not a serious prob-
lem where the co-owners are married. Diversion of the property
from the co-owner's family is not a significant problem since
the co-owners generally have the same descendants.207 Consid-
205. In the field study, 861 out of 918 items of personalty (93.9
percent) held in some form of co-ownership were held by husband
and wife. See Appendix VI.
206. The earlier real estate study turned up 98 percent husband
wife joint tenancies. See generally Hines, supra note 192.
207. This has always been one of the grounds used to explain the
repugnancy of the survivorship feature of joint tenancy. See York v.
Stone, 1 Salk. 158, 91 Eng. Rep. 146 (Ch. 1709); Nash v. Martin, 90 Ga.
App. 235, 82 S.E.2d 658 (1954); Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191
N.W. 213 (1922).
[Vol. 54:509
1970] PERSONAL PROPERTY JOINT TENANCIES 551
eration was given to the advisability of limiting the presumption
to husbands and wives having the same children, or to some
other variation of the "preferred spouse"208 concept. Allegiance
to a policy of trying to make the law primarily responsive to
the normal situation would seem to require the omission of
such a limitation on grounds that it would unduly mar the sim-
plicity of the statute. On the positive side, the ready availability
of assets and the rapid title clearance possible through joint ten-
ancy ownership both have special value to a surviving spouse.
Estate planners in particular will see dire results in an offi-
cial preference for husband and wife joint tenancies. The mari-
tal deduction eases the tax disadvantages of joint tenancy be-
tween spouses, but it by no means eliminates them. If the fear
is that expressing statutory favor for joint tenancy will beguile
property owners into creation of unwise co-ownerships, the em-
pirical data would suggest that most of the beguilement has al-
ready occurred.20 9 It is hard to see how bringing the law in line
with existing patterns of property ownership can greatly af-
fect the estate planner's responsibility to use his best efforts to
assure his client sound ownership arrangements. For the ordi-
nary citizen whose estate is too small to require tax planning,
the change in the law simply increases the chance that his in-
formal planning devices will accomplish his intent.
2. Creation between all other Co-owners: Requirement of a
Writing Manifesting a Clear Intent to Create a Joint Tenancy
The existing policy against survivorship rights is consistent
with the normal intent of co-owners other than husband and
wife and should be retained. The requisites for creating a joint
tenancy should, however, be expressly indicated. One initial
question that must be resolved is whether to permit joint ten-
ancies among more than two persons. Multiple party joint ten-
ancies are unusual210 and a limitation to two parties would
avoid some potentially sticky problems.21' Nevertheless, given
208. See UNrromw PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (Working Draft No. 5,
1968).
209. Appendix VI shows that less than 50 percent of the nonhus-
band and wife co-ownerships were joint tenancies. Similar findings
were made in the earlier real estate study. Hines, supra note 192,
at 617.
210. The current study uncovered only 19 cases of multiple own-
ership. See Appendix Ill.
211. One problem is the difficulty of ascertaining the respective
interests of the parties; another is deciding the relationship between
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sufficient safeguards, no great harm can be foreseen in permit-
ting those who so desire to enter into multiple joint tenancies.
The rule that death of 'one multiple joint tenant does not affect
the relationship among the others seems so well settled212 that
specific recital in the statute would be unnecessary.
The statute should provide that a writing is required to
create a joint tenancy, whether between two, or among multiple,
tenants. This is generally the effect of the decisions,213 but
codification can do no harm. The statute should expressly state
the language sufficient to create a survivorship right. All of the
common expressions used to create joint tenancies could be sanc-
tioned,214 and if inflexibility is regarded as a problem, the statute
could approve of any language evincing an intent to create a sur-
vivorship right. The statute should make clear that co-ownerships
lacking a writing with the requisite language will not be ac-
corded survivorship rights. It would thus be unnecessary to
include any provision classifying ownerships failing to meet the
statutory standard. Depending on the particular facts involved,
such would either be tenancies in common or sole ownerships.
B. LEGISLATIVE COVERAGE OF JOINT ANID SURVIVOR AccouNTs
The uniqueness of the joint and survivor account justifies
separate legislative treatment. Because the party creating ajoint and survivor account often does not intend to make an
irrevocable gift to the other co-depositors, it has been difficult
to fit the joint account into the joint tenancy mold. Courts are
gradually recognizing that the joint and survivor account is a
property form not readily susceptible to explanation by, or en-
forcement under, existing legal doctrines governing other co-
survivors after the death of one or two of the original parties. See
Folsam v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
212. See 4 G. THoMPsON, REAL PROPERTY § 1776, at 14 (1961); 2
Ai=icAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 7 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
213. Some states, however, seem willing to recognize an oral sur-
vivorship agreement. In re Estate of Louden, 249 Iowa 1393, 1397, 92
N.W.2d 409, 412 (1958); Peterson v. Lake City Bank & Trust Co., 181
Minn. 128, 231 N.W. 794 (1930); rn re W.iteside's Estate, 159 Neb. 362,
67 N.W.2d 141 (1954); Estate of Gablac, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W.2d 720
(1953).
214. Thus, the terms "as joint tenants," "with right of survivorship,"
"not as tenants in common" and "payable to either/or the survivor,"
should be recited in the statute. See also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 76-1-5(1963); CoNw. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-14a (1960); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN.
§ 67-310 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-14.1 (1961); N.C. GEr. STAT.§ 41-2,1 (1966); UTAI CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (1963).
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ownerships. Acceptance of this difference is the key to working
out a system of joint account rules that will adequately serve
the needs of property owners. Legislative assumption of the
responsibility for recognition and regulation of the joint account
offers the best hope for bringing order out of confusion.
Legislative reform of joint account law should have several
important objectives. Achieving uniformity in the rule applied
by the various institutions offering joint accounts is one essential
goal. A second objective is the authorization of a sufficient
variety of joint account arrangements with clearly distinguish-
able incidents to satisfy the ordinary requirements of account
depositors. A third purpose is express declaration of the ex-
istence of a survivorship right in those account forms where it
is intended.
1. Scope of the Statute
The act should be made applicable to all types of contracts
of deposit 15 offered by any financial institution or other or-
ganization accepting investments. At a minimum, coverage
should include accounts in banks, trust companies, savings banks,
building and loan associations, savings and loan companies,
credit unions, regulated investment companies and securities
brokers.2 6
Further, it should be provided that the act is to be the ex-
clusive standard for determining the validity and effect of joint
account deposits within the jurisdiction. Treating joint accounts
through separate provisions in various statutes which regulate
the activities of financial institutions is confusing; uniformity
can be achieved only through making the matter a part of the
general property laws.21 7
2. Creation of Statutory Account Forms
A statute specifying the language to be used in a form docu-
ment and providing for the effects of using such a form is a
conventional legislative remedy for a problem in which ambi-
guity is frequent and disruptive. For each type of account al-
215. Accounts covered should include checking and savings ac-
counts, certificates of deposit, share accounts and similar arrangements.
216. See UNWuoRMu PROBATE CODE § 6-101(4) (Working Draft No.
5, 1968) for a comprehensive definition of financial institutions.
217. Accordingly, exsting provisions in various state statutes gov-
erning joint accounts should be specifically repealed by the reform leg-
islation.
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lowed, the statute should specify the formalities required to
create the account and the rights cf the parties and the institu-
tion holding the account.
Two questions are raised by the apparent rigidity of this
statutory system. First, it might be argued that prescribing the
content of account agreements unduly restricts the depositor's
freedom to negotiate his own special arrangement. So long as
the statute authorizes a sufficient variety of accounts to meet
the usual needs of depositors, the cost to the public in reduced
ability to pursue novel account ownerships is easily outweighed
by the gain in certainty and simplicity.
Second, to what extent will account forms substantially but
not exactly complying with the requirements of the statute be
recognized as coming within the purview of the act? The statute
could include a "substantial equivalence" phrase to indicate that
forms meeting the spirit of the act are not to be disregarded for
failure to be letter perfect.218 Of course, deviation from an ab-
solute adherence to the statutory language opens the door to
disputes over the degree of similarity between the form and devi-
ant document, and perhaps to arguments over the intent of the
depositor using an irregular account form. This problem does not
appear excessively troublesome. Once the statutory forms are
enacted, firms offering joint accounts will naturally be quick to
adopt them. Thus, the issuance of defective forms should soon
be eliminated.
A problem is also apparent in tlhe handling of accounts that
clearly do not meet the statutory standards. Should the general
co-ownership law be brought into play or should the statute
specify the results of failure to create a recognized account form?
Although it is tempting to assign to the courts the task of un-
tangling defective accounts on the ground that the depositor's
intent would be more likely to be achieved through such an ap-
proach, the corrective force of the statute would be strength-
ened by stipulating the result of a failure to meet the statutory
joint account requirements. Thus, the statute should expressly
provide that all accounts in the names of two or more persons
which do not comply with the prescribed joint account forms
will be deemed tenancy in common accounts. Besides foreclosing
disputes over the effect of defective account arrangements per-
218. This technique is used in the North Carolina statute govern-
ing joint bank accounts with right of survivorship. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41-2.1(g) (1966).
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haps intended to create survivorship rights, such a provision
would also implicitly sanction and clarify the status of the in-
tended tenancy in common account occasionally used by busi-
ness associates and families.
The recommended legislation should recognize three distinct
types of multiple accounts: joint and survivor accounts, pay-on-
death accounts, and convenience accounts.219 A separate form
for creating each account would be prescribed along with the
formalities for creation. The effects of the account would be
set forth only as they concern the rights of its holder to make
payments and the ownership interests of the parties. Although
some advantage may be seen in handling the effects of joint
accounts on third party claimants, such as creditors and surviv-
ing spouses, in the special account law,220 it seems preferable to
defer that task to statutes covering a broader array of ownership
forms.221 The confusion which currently exists in co-ownership
law is attributable in large measure to a tendency to create a
separate set of rules for each type of ownership form. Rejection
of this piecemeal approach in the joint account statute may en-
courage the enactment of needed broad-gauge reforms.
Contrary to the treatment in the general joint tenancy stat-
ute, no special recognition should be given husband and wife
joint accounts. The principal reason for omitting such treatment
is the desire to reduce the potential for confusion by limiting
the number of forms to those absolutely essential. Providing
that all husband and wife joint accounts are presumed to be
subject to survivorship rights would not only necessitate two
series of forms, but would also conflict with the basic pattern
219. Of course, the tenancy in common account is also indirectly
authorized as a residuary multiple party account. No special account
contract form need be specified, however, as any account in two or
more names that does not comply with the statutory requirements for
the three other types of joint accounts will automatically be deemed a
tenancy in common account.
220. This approach is taken by the UNwORmi PROBATE CODE § 6-
102-07 (Working Draft No. 5, 1968), and by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1
(1966).
221. Where basic policy changes are involved, such as the subjection
of the survivor's interest in joint tenancy property to claims of creditors
and of the surviving spouse and dependents, it seems undesirable to
effect the reforms only in so limited an area of property ownership asjoint accounts. For example, it does not seem reasonable to subject thejoint account to the statutory interest of the deceased depositor's spouse
and not subject other joint tenancies and revocable trusts to the same
claims. Reforms of this nature should be designed to reach all com-
parable holding forms. If they do not, they may simply cause a shift
from one probate avoidance device to another.
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of creating three distinct types of joint accounts. If the joint
account statute is successful in transforming selection of a joint
account form into a simple and efficient process having a high
correlation between depositor intent and account effect, the need
for a special treatment of husband and wife account ownership
is not as great as in the general joint tenancy area.
(a) Joint and Survivor Accounts
The statute should contain express authorization for the cre-
ation of accounts in the names of two or more persons, payable
to any of them, or to the survivor. Consideration could be given
to restricting the joint account form to two depositors; however,
this is inconsistent with current practice and with the law in
nearly every state.222 The right of any joint depositor to make
withdrawals at any time should be clearly spelled out in the
form along with an explicit declaration of the statutory survivor-
ship right.
To create such a joint and survivor account, the account
agreement must be substantially the same as the prescribed
form and must be signed by all parties. The requirement of
all parties' signatures changes the present law in the states228
which permit a nonsigning donee to take by survivorship. Be-
cause the terms of the suggested account form grant all named
depositors lifetime powers to draw on the account, compelling
all parties to sign seems not only reasonable but necessary. If
the parties desire a survivorship account wherein only one party
has the right to make withdrawals, the pay-on-death form should
be used.
The statute should protect a bank which honors any with-
drawal by a person named in the account, and should specify
the rights of the co-depositors in the account. It is suggested
that the legislation provide that the interests of the co-depositors
among themselves are to be determined on the basis of contribu-
tions, with the proviso that in the absence of satisfactory proof
of contributions, the amounts in the account shall be deemed
owned by all equally. This provision more or less codifies ex-
isting law, and is consistent with both the tax law and the pro-
222. See, e.g., Am STAT. ANN. § 67-521 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-6 (1963).
223. See Barbour v. First Citizens Nat1 Bank of Watertown, 77
S.D. 196, 86 N.W.2d 526 (1957); Kelbe.ger v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of LaCrosse, 270 Wis. 434, 71 N.W.2d 257 (1955).
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posed creditor's rights legislation. It should be helpful in avoid-
ing litigation over ownership rights in accounts.224
(b) Pay-on-Death Accounts
For too long the law has concerned itself with academic
present interest requirements and statute of wills technicalities
and refused to sanction what the property-owning public really
wants-a simple and reliable device for transferring funds from
a decedent to a survivor without creating lifetime rights in the
donee. In theory, the pay-on-death form fits the bill perfectly,
and its practical feasibility has already been demonstrated in
relation to several types of investments. 225 Concern for the sanc-
tity of more formal testamentary transfer devices seem hollow
in view of what is accomplished through existing probate avoid-
ance devices. 226 The proposed legislation should authorize gen-
eral use of the pay-on-death account.
The pay-on-death account form is designed to serve the in-
tentions of the many depositors who desire the survivorship
feature of the joint and survivor account, but do not want to
surrender control of the property during their lifetime. Under
the terms of the prescribed pay-on-death deposit contracts, the
account is the sole property of the depositor during his lifetime
and subject to withdrawals only by him, but at his death it is
payable in equal shares to the named beneficiary or beneficiaries.
By using the pay-on-death account, the depositor need not worry,
as he now must with the joint and survivor form, that the in-
tended beneficiary might obtain possession of the passbook or
otherwise reach the account during the depositor's lifetime.
The pay-on-death form also caters to the whims of the de-
positor who does not want the intended beneficiary to know of
the possible gift. The account need only be signed by the de-
positor. However, because this account arrangement brushes
uncomfortably close to a purely testamentary transfer, a greater
than usual formality should be considered lest the departure from
the policy of the wills acts appears too large. Having the de-
positor's signature witnessed by one disinterested party might
224. For appropriate language, see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-103-
04 (Working Draft No. 5, 1968).
225. The United States Savings Bond is for many purposes a pay-
on-death arrangement. See generally Barber & Segatto, Joint Tenancy
Property and Estate Planning, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 1022.
226. See Wellman, The Joint and Survivor Account in Michigan-
Progress Through Confusion, 63 McH. L. REv. 629, 637, 653, 661 (1965).
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be one reasonable concession to both formality and practical-
ity;227 requiring notarization of the signature would also impart
some note of deliberation without unduly encumbering the open-
ing of accounts.
Some commentators 228 prefer to bring about the objectives
of the pay-on-death account through recognition of the Totten
trust.229 It does not seem, however, that the bank account trust
possesses any desirable feature not also found in the simple pay-
on-death account. If the legislature is to approve such highly
testamentary arrangements, it would seem better to do so di-
rectly and simply through the pay-on-death device than through
the more complex and confusing bank account trust.230 If the
pay-on-death account receives legislative approval, consideration
could be given to the elimination of the bank account trust.23'
(c) Convenience Account
In most states, the law does not presently provide a simple
device to meet the needs of the individual who desires to take
precautions against his own future disability or incompetence.
What this person desires is normally analogous to a revocable
trust. He wants an arrangement whereby the property is owned
solely by him, but is subject to some powers in a designated per-
son to apply the assets for the owner's benefit. While such a per-
son can create a trust, execute a power of attorney authorizing
another to act in his behalf or, where permitted, appoint a standby
conservator, these techniques are not practical solutions for the
unsophisticated small property owner. Each alternative necessi-
tates professional assistance which the property owner with mod-
227. If this requirement is established, some definition of "disinter-
ested person" will be required. Maximum assurance of objectivity
would be achieved by requiring the signature of some person not em-
ployed by the institution handling the account.
228. See UnroRM PROBATE CODE § 6..107, comment (Working Draft
No. 5, 1968).
229. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71. N.E. 748 (1904); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUsTs § 58 (1959). Cf. note 159 supra.
230. For discussion of the problems incident to the Totten trust, see
Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Wll, 42 N.C.L. REv. 214 (1963);
Note, Totten Trust-Judicial Midwifery, 14 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 63(1958); Comment, Totten Trusts in Kansas, 9 U. KA.. L. REV. 46 (1960);
Comment, Trusts: The Totten Trust in Florida, 10 U. FA. L. REV. 235
(1957); 1 A. SCOTT, TRusTs §§ 58.2-58.6 (1967).
231. This result could be accomplished by a statute declaring that
the title to any property or account held in the name of the owner as
trustee shall be deemed to belong solely to the owner unless the terms
of the trust are adequately stated in the transfer document or in a sep-
arate instrument.
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est assets is not likely to seek. The power of attorney is further
limited by the rule that it is revoked by incompetency like any
other such agency agreement.23 2 Currently, if the person con-
cerned about his future ability to manage his funds seeks to
achieve his objectives through an account arrangement, he is
unlikely to succeed and he runs a risk of subjecting his property
to an unwanted survivorship right. If there is a legislative dis-
position to do so, self-protective intentions could be realized
through the creation of a convenience account rider to be placed
on any regular account.
The terms of the convenience rider would make clear that
the general nature of the account is not changed by the addition
of the rider. The sole effect of the rider would be to permit
the depositor to designate a person authorized to make with-
drawals from the account on behalf of the depositor. The signa-
ture of the authorized convenience withdrawer would be re-
quired on the account form. The holder of the account would
be specifically protected for any payments made to the author-
ized person until such time as the authorization is revoked in
writing by the depositor. The statute should also provide, of
course, that the authorization of the convenience party is not
revoked by the incompetency of the principal depositor.23 3 The
form of the rider would conclusively rebut any claim of an in-
terest in the account by the party authorized to withdraw, and
hopefully would eliminate the family squabbles that now arise
over alleged convenience accounts held in an inconsistent form.
The convenience account approach has obvious advantages over
the nonsurvivorship joint account sometimes recommended in
this area.23 4 Under any joint account arrangement, disputes
concerning the extent of the interest of the convenience party
may still arise. On its face such an arrangement seems to create
a tenancy in common, so it could easily result in a post-death
claim by the other party (or the other party's estate) to a one-
half interest in the account.
C. CREDITORS RIGHTs IN JoiNT TENANCY
1. Inter Vivos
Quantitative uncertainty is the major flaw in the creditor's
232. See Wellman, supra note 226, at 667.
233. See W. SEAVEY, AGENcY § 48 (1964); F. MECEM, Oum=Es
AGENcY § 277 (4th ed. 1952).
234. See Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Mud-
dle, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 376, 404 (1959); Wellman, supra note 226, at 666.
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ability to reach assets held in joint tenancy by a surviving
debtor. Therefore, the primary thrust of legislation in this area
should be to clarify the rules for determining the extent of such
a debtor's interest. The fairest rule seems to be one where the
interest would depend on the extenat of the debtor's contribu-
tions. Even a statute which simply states such a rule would be
an improvement in many jurisdictions; but to take a healthy
stab at meaningful reform, the act should address such questions
as how "contribution" should be defined, what stand should be
taken on presumptions of fact and who should ultimately bear the
burden of proving contributions. The definition of contribution
must take into account the possibility of growth or depreciation
in the jointly held property as well as the effect of partial with-
drawals. 23 5 Although arguments can. be made for each of the po-
sitions concerning burden of proof, it would be difficult to justify
a rule that requires the creditor to prove the debtor's contribu-
tions. It seems equally unjust to presume total contributions by
the debtor and thereby force the other co-owner to prove his own
contribution. The best rule would presume contributions to be
equal in the absence of adequate proof to the contrary.2 6 This
permits either party to prove that contributions were unequal.
If the debtor's apparently equal co-ownership interest is to be
reduced, the burden of proof is on -the party most likely to be
able to produce the necessary evidence.
The legislative revision should also specify the point in the
collection process at which a survivorship right is severed. Any
juncture up to the final issuance of the sheriff's deed is arbitrary
in the sense that the debtor could still redeem the property by
paying the debt. Nevertheless, it is unconscionable to keep the
creditor's recovery in jeopardy until the unity of title is severed.
The sale on execution seems a reasonable point at which to de-
clare a severance. If a rationale is required, a good argument
can be made that the unity of interest is in fact severed at that
point.23 7 To avoid unnecessary prejudice to the other co-owner,
235. Consider the following definition:
"Contribution" of a party as of any given time is the sum of the
values of all money and property deposited or invested by or
for him adjusted for his proportionate share of gain or loss and
any income retained therein less the sum of the values of all
withdrawals of money and property made by or for him.
236. This is the approach adopted in relation to creditor's rights injoint accounts by the Ui, r=omv PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101, 6-103-04 (Work-
ing Draft No. 5, 1968) and by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (2) (1966).
237. See Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38
MiNN, L., REv. 466, 493' (1954).
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it could be expressly provided that the survivorship right is re-
vived by a subsequent satisfaction of the creditor's claim through
redemption or other process which results in restoration of the
property to the debtor. Marking the point of severance be-
comes less critical under the changes in the creditor's rights
after death as noted below.
2. After Death
Enlarging and clarifying the rights of claimants against
property owned by a deceased joint tenant requires both the
adoption of a new legal stance toward probate avoidance tech-
niques and a new set of collection procedures. The recommen-
dations below are premised on acceptance of a general policy
that property in which the owner had substantial beneficial
ownership interest up to the time of his death and which was
transferred through a probate avoidance device should be sub-
jected to the claims against the deceased transferor. In the joint
tenancy area this policy is generally sought to be implemented
by disregarding the factor of death and attempting to award
the claimant the same interest in joint tenancy property after
death as he would have had immediately before. Permeating
the suggested reforms is the concept of the desirability of achiev-
ing equitable treatment for claimants against a deceased joint
tenant or his estate with the least impairment of the utility of
the joint tenancy form of ownership.
(a) Liens not Tolled by Death
Initially, the continuing validity of liens created by claims
against the deceased co-owner should be clearly established, for
the death of the debtor should not affect the enforceability of
valid liens that have attached to his property. An express state-
ment that the enforceability of the lien is neither diminished nor
enhanced by the joint tenant's death should suffice to achieve
the desired result.238
(b) Rights of General Creditors
(1) The Principles
As in the case of the secured creditor, fairness is best
achieved by assuring generally that the creditor's rights to reach
238. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. AxN. § 47-14f (1960); NEa. REV. STAT.
§ 30-624 (1964).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the property are neither reduced nor enlarged by the debtor's
death. Therefore, it is recommended that a creditor should be
permitted to pierce the survivorship arrangement to satisfy a
claim against a deceased joint tenant. If the creditor could have
attached, garnished or executed upon the property during the
debtor's life, he should be allowed to continue to rely on his
debtor's interest after the debtor's death. Of course, the credi-
tor's claim should never exceed the deceased co-owner's lifetime
interest in the asset,239 and the legislation should expressly so
state.
Well-defined rules governing a creditor's rights to reach
joint tenancy assets during the debtor's lifetime are obviously
critical to effectuate a reform plan based on preservation of such
rights. Suggestions for a workable inter vivos doctrine were
made above and need not be reiterated here other than to sug-
gest the advantage of having a unified policy before and after
death for ascertaining a person's interest in jointly owned prop-
erty subject to levy or garnishment by his creditors.
(2) The Procedures
Additional questions revolve around whether the intended
collection process should be spelled out in detail and some
mechanism provided to facilitate the assertion of claims. It
would be possible simply to subject joint tenancy property in
the hands of the survivor to the debts of a deceased co-owner
and let the parties and the courts fill in the interstices. 240 If
the discussion that follows does not exhaust the possible sub-
stantive and structural issues raised in designing a collection
procedure, it should at least demonstrate that there are too many
potentially troublesome problems to leave the development of
procedures to chance.
239. Both the Nebraska and South Dakota statutes expressly subject
the creditor to all homestead and legal exemptions in the jointly owned
property. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (1964); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 30-21A-1(1969). It is not clear whether this exception relates to exemptions
that were claimed by the decedent or exemptions claimed by the sur-
vivor. If, in the hands of the survivor, the property is not exempt from
execution, it is difficult to justify denying a creditor the right to reach
a proportionate share of the property on grounds that the property was
exempt in the hands of the decedent.
240. This is more or less the policy of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§ 6-102-04 (Working Draft No. 5, 1968). It is also the approach of the
North Carolina statutes on bank accounts and corporate securities. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 41-2 (1963) (bank accounts); § 25-8-407 (Supp. 1967)
(corporate securities).
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The resolution of several major issues is essential to the
development of a serviceable set of procedures enabling claim-
ants to reach joint tenancy property. Recent statutes enacted
in several states241 offer, at best, spotty guidance for steering a
course through the complexities of this area. The first crucial
question is whether the claimant's right is to be against the sur-
vivor personally, against the property, or against both. The
claimant, of course, would be afforded maximum protection if
he had rights against both the property and the survivor. On
the other hand, if the survivor's own liability is to be minimized,
limiting the claim to an in rem action against the property
would seem to be the best course. However, both of these ap-
proaches jeopardize one of the valuable attributes of joint ten-
ancy-the survivor's ability to transfer a clear title to the prop-
erty promptly.
Subjecting the property itself to creditors' claims would po-
tentially restrict the survivor's power to alienate any asset taken
through joint tenancy and represented by a title document,
most notably real estate. A potential purchaser would un-
doubtedly insist on proof that the property would not be at-
tached by claimants against the deceased co-owner. Furnishing
satisfactory proof of freedom from creditors' claims could be
very difficult, much more so, for example, than proving the
absence of tax liens.
One means of dealing with this problem is to limit the time
in which claimants can reach joint tenancy property.242 This
solution simply reduces the degree of inconvenience to the sur-
vivor who intends to transfer his interest, but it would seem
essential to avoid congestion in real estate transfers. A more
direct course of action to relieve hardships would be to ex-
pressly free from the possibility of claims property in the hands
of a transferee for value who has taken from the survivor.243
The simplest route around the transferability problem is to
241. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2
(1963); S.D. Comp. LAWS § 30-21A-1 (1969).
242. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624(1) (1964); S.D. Comp. LAWS
§ 30-21A-2 (1969).
243. It should be made clear that the purchaser need not be without
notice to take free of possible creditor claims. It is doubtful that a pur-
chaser of real estate or corporate securities from a surviving joint
tenant could avoid constructive notice of the possibility of creditor
claims. Cf. Guerin v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 68 Mont. 365, 218 P. 949
(1923); Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878); Johnson v. Williams,
37 Kan. 179, 14 P. 537 (1887).
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assign personal liability to the survivor and avoid subjecting the
property itself to claims. The survivor's liability would be lim-
ited by the value of the deceased co-owner's interest in the
property at the time of his death. The two states which have
recently enacted special statutes governing creditor's rights
against joint tenancy property generally employ this technique
except that they link the survivor's liability to the decedent's
contribution to the joint tenancy determined as of the time of
death.244 This rule does not appear sound since it denies the
claimant the benefit of his debtor's gain from a good invest-
ment. Tying the survivor's liabili.ty to the value of the de-
cedent's interest at death provides a fairer approximation to the
position the creditor would have enjoyed had death not inter-
vened. Either formulation of this approach places on the claim-
ant the risk of the survivor's insolvency. It also imposes on the
survivor the risk of the post-death market. For example, the
property could be accidentally destroyed shortly after the debt-
or's death. Hardship situations could, however, be avoided by
permitting the survivor to elect to renounce his survivorship
right,245 in which case his interest would be reckoned as if the
deceased co-owner were still alive. An even more direct cure
would be to limit the survivor's liability to the value of the de-
cedent's proportional interest in the joint tenancy property
either at the time of his death or at the time the claim is as-
serted, whichever is less.
As will become apparent, working out the enforcement of
claims against a deceased joint tenant solely in terms of the
personal liability of the survivor complicates the design of col-
lection procedures in comparison to directly subjecting the prop-
erty to creditor process; however, the preservation of free trans-
ferability of the property by the survivor seems well worth the
complication. Even though the result should be clear, the stat-
ute should expressly exclude from liability bona fide purchasers
from the survivor.
A second question concerns the circumstances under which
joint tenancy assets will be subjected to claims against the de-
ceased co-owner. The favored alternative is to restrict the
244. NEB. RE,. STAT. § 30-624(1) (1964); S.D. CoMPn. LAws § 30-
21A-4 (Supp. 1969).
245. Such a provision would be a legislative innovation; the courts,
however, have occasionally approved such renunciations. See Bradley
v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 123 A.2d 148 (1956) where a surviving joint de-
positor was allowed to renounce her interest and avoid inheritance tax.
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vulnerability of joint tenancy property to situations in which
the estate of the deceased is insolvent. This is the approach
taken by both states that have enacted special statutes concern-
ing creditors' post-death rights in joint tenancy.246 Permitting
claimants to reach the assets only in cases of insolvency offers
full protection to the claimant while doing a minimum of violence
to the surviving joint tenant's expectations.
If it were decided to subject surviving joint tenants to debts
in both solvent and insolvent estates, the administrative compli-
cations would be severe, but probably not overwhelming. An
abatement order would have to be established between estate
assets and survivorship assets. If joint tenancy property were
assigned a low abatement priority, estate fiduciaries could be put
to a great deal of inconvenience in trying to collect assets in the
possession of survivors. If survivorship assets were equated to
specific devises and legacies, seemingly the most reasonable ap-
proach, it is unlikely the responsibility for paying estate debts
would be significantly shifted in most estates. The principal ob-
jection to extending the survivor's liability to the debts of solvent
estates is that it represents a great incursion into the probate
avoidance feature of joint tenancy but adds nothing to the pro-
tection of estate creditors.
Even if claimants are permitted to reach joint tenancy prop-
erty only in insolvent estates, a question still arises as to what
extent the joint tenancy property will be brought back into the
estate. For instance, if estate debts exceed estate assets by
1000 dollars, can only 1000 dollars of joint tenancy property
be reached to pay debts, or is the entire interest of the de-
cedent in the jointly owned property reachable? Again, be-
cause the primary thrust of the legislation is to protect creditors,
not to upset joint tenancy ownerships, the statute should pro-
vide that only so much of the joint tenancy property can be
reached as is necessary to pay claims remaining after assets in
the probate estate are exhausted. Adoption of this approach
makes it unnecessary to face questions concerning the abate-
ment priority to be assigned joint tenancy property in relation
to estate assets. Abatement problems could still arise, however,
in cases of a multiple party joint tenancy or where the decedent
was a joint tenant of several assets with different persons. The
act should either provide that all survivors contribute ratably to
246. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-624(3) (1964); S.D. CoMp. LAWS § 30-
21A-5 (Supp. 1969).
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make up deficiencies in the estate's ability to pay claims or
equate joint tenancy assets to other estate property for purposes
of establishing an abatement order..2 47
The third issue concerns the claims to which joint tenancy
property may be applied. Will the survivorship right be subject
only to debts in existence at the co-owner's death, or may estate
expenses and charges also be asserted? Strict adherence to the
concept of ignoring the fact of death in enforcement of claims
would seem to deny recognition of estate expenses since they
arise only by reason of the joint tenant's death. State probate
codes, however, uniformly accord such claims a priority over
ordinary debts of the decedent.248 The two state statutes dealing
specifically with creditors subject the survivorship interest to
"debts and obligations" 249 of the decedent. The North Carolina
statutes governing joint bank accounts and joint registration of
securities subject jointly owned assets to claims of creditors and
to governmental rights.2 5 0  It seems unlikely that any of these
acts would be construed to include expenses of administration.
Why these statutes do not include estate expenses is not clear,
but no good reason appears to justify the donee in a probate
avoidance transfer taking his interest free of the expenses result-
ing from the donor's death.25 1- Therefore, it is recommended that
the statute expressly subject the survivor to liability to pay ex-
penses and charges of administration. The estate fiduciary
should be authorized to pursue whatever procedures are neces-
sary to enforce the claims against tae survivor. Estate expenses
and charges for which the survivor would be responsible would
include court costs, administration expenses, funeral and burial
expenses, expenses of decedent's last illness and taxes other
than death taxes. The allowance to a surviving spouse would
presumably be a claim enforceable against a surviving joint ten-
ant in jurisdictions that designate such a payment an estate ex-
pense.252 In assessing the severity of subjecting the survivor to
247. Presumably, a survivor's interest in joint tenancy property
would be at least equivalent to that of a specific devisee under the
decedent's will. For what this would. mean in terms of abatement
see, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-109 (Working Draft No. 5, 1968).
248. See 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNING, WILLs, TRUSTS 1 2652 for statutory
material of each state.
249. NEE. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (1964); S.D. Comp. LAws § 30-21A-1
(Supp. 1969).
250. N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 41-2.1(3) (1966) & 25-8-407(c) (Supp.
1967).
251. See generally Wellnan, supra note 226.
252. See 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNING, WILLS, TRUSTS 2734 for statutory
material of each state.
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such claims, it should be remembered that the liability is limited
to situations where the estate is insolvent. Whether the survivor
would also be liable for the payment of estate taxes would depend
upon the local rule on apportionment of such taxes.253
The fourth issue is whether claimants should proceed
through an estate administration or go against the survivor sep-
arately to reach joint tenancy property. The latter procedure is
prescribed in the Nebraska and South Dakota statutes,254 but
it should be noted that neither of these acts make the survivor
liable for estate expenses and charges. Reliance on actions out-
side estate administration necessitates the creation of special pre-
sumptions on the question of insolvency of the estate2 55 and
generally seems a less secure method of treating claimants equi-
tably.
Therefore, it is recommended that the legislation specifically
provide that the survivor be liable to the estate representative
for the payment of the deceased joint tenant's debts and estate
expenses and charges. The liability of the survivor can be
enforced under the general powers conferred on the personal
representative to collect assets of the estate. Reliance on the
estate administration process avoids the need for any special
notice to the survivor by claimants intending to rely on the lia-
bility created by the act. If the estate is insolvent, the personal
representative will be obligated to assert the claim against the
survivor to the same degree as he is required to collect from any
other debtor of the estate.
It may be argued that restricting claimants to reaching joint
tenancy assets in this manner will result in the opening of es-
tates that otherwise do not justify administration. This may
be so, but the risk seems a reasonable price to pay for the as-
surance of orderly collection of assets subject to claims and fair
allocation among claimants. In an insolvent estate where no
other reason for administration exists, the claimant's power to
reach joint tenancy assets may be a sufficient lever to extract
253. See id. % 2667 for statutory material of each state.
254. NXB. REv. STAT. § 30-624 (1964); S.D. Co ivw. LAws § 30-21A-1
(Supp. 1969).
255. For example, the South Dakota Act obscurely provides:
[I]f no petition is filed in court to probate the deceased joint
o.ner's estate within thirty days from the date of his death,
there shall be a presumption of evidence that the property
standing in the name of decedent at the time of his death was
insufficient to pay his debts and obligations.
S.D. Coixm. LAws § 30-21A-3 (Supp. 1969).
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payment from a survivor who does not wish to have his interest
exposed to potentially greater liability for other estate expenses.
A related question is whether a third party who holds assets
which are owned in joint tenancy should be temporarily pro-
hibited from releasing them to the survivor so that claimants
can be assured a fair chance of finding the assets before they
are dissipated. For example, should financial institutions be
required to retain the proceeds in a joint account for a specified
period after receiving notice of the death of one depositor?
Here again, conflict is created between the interest of maintain-
ing ready accessibility to jointly held property and that of af-
fording maximum protection to claimants. A decision to tempo-
rarily impound such assets necessitates the creation of rules gov-
erning the type of notice of death, the holding period, the pro-
cedure for obtaining a release of the assets and the liability of
the third party for improper payment.25  Special treatment of
surviving spouse joint tenants might also be considered.2 57 On
balance, the added complexity of adopting such a plan coupled
with the earlier recommendation to rely solely on the survivor's
personal liability leads to the conclusion that joint tenancy's ad-
vantage of making assets promptly available to the survivor
should be retained by permitting immediate release of the assets.
The survivor's personal liability is not affected by his expendi-
ture or transfer of the property.
It is questionable whether provision should be made for a
special time period limiting the personal representative's right
to assert a claim against a surviving joint tenant. Both Nebraska
and South Dakota have restricted the duration of the survivor's
liability to a relatively short period.258 The reason for setting
such a period is not clear, but is probably based on a combination
of the ancient insistence on creditor diligence and a vague notion
that it is undesirable to give such extraordinary procedures a
very long lease on life. In the absence of more compelling
256. Compare IowA CODE ANN. § 534.11(8) (Supp. 1969) where a
six month holding period is provided for savings and loan accounts,
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1(b) (4) (1966) where a deceased joint
tenant's portion of a joint account is to be paid to his representative to
be held for payment of government and creditor claims.
257. The notion is that immediate release of a limited sum to a sur-
viving spouse might be authorized to enable the decedent's family to
meet current expenses.
258. NEB. R.v. STAT. § 30-624(1) (1964) (three months after death of
deceased joint owner); S.D. COmP. LAWS § 30-21A-2 (Supp. 1969) (six
months after death of deceased joint owner).
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grounds, it seems difficult to justify terminating the liability of
a joint tenant earlier than the time when ordinary claimants are
barred from asserting claims against the estate.
Restricting the claim to a personal action against the sur-
vivor obviates the need for a short period to facilitate transfer-
ability. Regular statutes of limitation on the underlying claims
and debts will operate to limit the duration of the survivor's lia-
bility. Furthermore, requiring the claimant to utilize the estate
administration procedure does incorporate a time limit of sorts
in most states through the general restriction placed on the
period in which administration may be opened.25 9  For these
reasons, no time limit on the survivor's liability is recommended.
D. EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM: PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE
A final question to be examined is whether the proposed
statute should apply prospectively only or whether an attempt
should be made to apply them to existing ownership arrange-
ments. Before exploring questions concerning the necessity or
desirability of retroactive application, some inquiry into the con-
stitutionality of such a provision seems in order.
1. Constitutional Questions
No serious constitutional argument can be made to prevent
giving the creditors' rights proposal immediate effect. A sur-
viving joint tenant's claim that he has a vested right to take
jointly owned property free of the claims of the deceased co-
owner's creditors would in all likelihood fail.260  The several
statutes subjecting survivorship interests to creditor claims have
encountered no constitutional challenges.
The legislation changing the ground rules governing the
recognition of joint tenancies between spouses presents a more
difficult question. The argument for unconstitutionality would
be based on the proposition that a co-owner has a right to have
the nature and extent of his interest determined under the law
as it existed at the time his ownership was created.261 Thus,
259. See 2 P-H ESTATE PLANNING, WILLs, TRUSTS 2610 for each state.
260. See L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE I!PROVEMEIET OF CONVEYANC-
ING BY LEGISLATION 257-58 (1960); J. ScURLocE, RETROACTIVE LEGISLA-
TION AF.FEcuNG INTERESTS n¢ LAND 8-10 (1953).
261. See Noyes v. Parker, 92 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1937) where it was
held that a statute abolishing joint tenancies or converting them into
tenancies in common applies only to future and not to past acts or con-
veyances, and does not affect joint tenants whose rights had become
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where the decedent husband was a co-owner with his wife in an
ambiguous arrangement, the estate's representative could urge
that the husband's interest as a tenant in common was vested
under the former law and could not be altered by subsequent
legislation instituting a presumption of joint tenancy.
If the legislature determined that as between married co-
owners the existing presumption against joint tenancy was based
on erroneous assumptions of fact and that the public interest
would be advanced by reversing the legal presumption, it is
unlikely that the statute's application to existing co-ownerships
would be held invalid under substantive due process standards.
2 2
Such an act extinguishes no established interest; it merely
changes the evidentiary presumption used to determine the
nature of ownership.263 Furthermore, enactment of the stat-
ute would be notice to all married co-owners that henceforth
they will be presumed to be joint tenants. Any married co-
owner who wishes to hold property in other than joint tenancy
is free to rearrange his affairs.
Although perhaps unnecessary, provision for a reasonable
grace period between enactment and the effective date for re-
versal of the presumption would increase the probability that the
legislation would be sustained. 2 4 For example, the statute could
apply to all husband and wife co-ownerships created after en-
actment, but not to existing joint tenancies until a year (or
perhaps two years) after enactment. Such a deferral would
allow married co-owners who intend a tenancy in common to as-
certain the status of the existing arrangement and make neces-
sary alterations. Deferral substantially removes the spectre of
the co-owner dying shortly after the statutory change without
having had any real chance to evaluate his ownership arrange-
ment. Similar but more difficult federal constitutional questions
would be raised by applying the proposed multiple account stat-
ute to existing accounts. If this legislation were given retro-
vested prior to passage of the statute. See J. ScURLocC, supra note
260, at 325-29 where it is asserted that restoration of the common law
presumption in favor of joint tenancy would create more cogent con-
stitutional objections than were raised by the statutes abolishing the
presumption.
262. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955). See also Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. RaV. 63.
263. See L. SImEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 260, at 258-59.
264. See J. ScURLocK, supra note 260, at 73-85; L. Snwms & C.
TAYLOR, supra note 260, at 263-70.
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active effect, many existing joint account agreements might fail
to create the intended co-ownerships. To alter the law govern-
ing the effect of these completed contracts of deposit would
seem to raise more serious due process questions than reversal
of the presumption applied to co-ownerships generally.
The multiple bank account legislation must also overcome
the article I, section 10 prohibition of impairment of contract
obligations. Since El Paso v. Simmons, 265 however, it seems
doubtful that this clause has any real identity independent of
the concept of substantive due process. The contract and due
process clauses seem to have coalesced in terms of the standards
of reasonableness by which state legislation is evaluated,266 and
it seems that a court would look favorably on a fair deferral
period.267
Under state constitutional law the validity of the proposed
reforms is somewhat less certain. State constitutions generally
contain both due process provisions and prohibitions against im-
pairment of contract obligations. Traditionally, both of these
limitations on legislative power have been interpreted more
broadly by state courts than have the parallel federal provi-
sions.20 3 Nevertheless, if the proposed changes include a rea-
sonable grace period, it is difficult to see how any challenger
could sustain the burden of showing the direct detrimental fi-
nancial reliance on the former law which is ordinarily required
to strike down retroactive legislation on either due process or
impairment of contract grounds.26 9 The simple fact is that if
the co-owners are permitted a reasonable time to adjust their
arrangements and fail to do so, their own lack of diligence, not
the legislative change, causes the loss.
2. Policy Questions
Assuming that no constitutional objections bar the retroac-
265. 379 U.S. 497 (1965). See also Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
266. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
HARv. L. REV. 512, 890 (1944).
267. See L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 260, at 263-70; J. ScuR-
LOCK, supra note 260, at 82, 327.
268. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the
States, 34 MiNy. L. REv. 91 (1950).
269. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulations and Substantive
Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13, 22 (1958). See also J. ScuR-
LOCK, supra note 260, at 327 where it is noted that statutes giving joint
bank accounts conclusive effect as to ownership have been upheld as
being similar to statutes of limitations.
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tive application of the proposed reforms, it nevertheless seems
doubtful that as a matter of policy the statutes should be
so designed. The basic drawback is that there is a potential for
frustration of ownership expectations. Furthermore, it is ques-
tionable whether the proposed statutes relating to joint tenancy
creation and joint accounts require retroactive application to
achieve their objectives. The immediate impact of new legisla-
tion which is prospective only will almost certainly be to stimu-
late, among co-owners, a re-examination of their holding ar-
rangements. Outside of the bank account area, it seems reason-
able to expect that the legal folklore will quickly assimilate the
legislative message that survivorship is the norm among hus-
band and wife co-owners. The empirical data suggest that this
is unlikely to startle the typical married property owner.
As regards bank accounts, the mutual advantage that both
depositors and financial institutions will find in the new law
can be counted upon to phase out the old account cards quite
rapidly. In many jurisdictions, judicial handling of joint ac-
count cases seems to be moving in a direction consistent with
the objectives of the proposed legislation, so there is no great
disadvantage in leaving to the courts the resolution of the valid-
ity and effect of existing co-ownerships. It might be somewhat
confusing to live with two sets of laws relating to co-owner-
ships, but attorneys, at least, have become accustomed to such
complications. 70 It might be considered whether a simple pro-
cedure should be offered whereby property owners could bring
existing co-ownerships within the purview of the new legisla-
tion.2 71 Such a provision would seem unnecessary for joint bank
accounts in view of the ease with which the account contract
may be revised.
The creditor's rights legislation stands on a different foot-
ing. The common law rules curren.tly applied are grossly unfair
to the creditor of a joint tenant. Assuming the absence of sub-
stantial constitutional objectives, every effort should be made
to put this long overdue reform into immediate effect.
270. For example, probate law changes and tax law revisions often
provide for separate treatment of existing arrangements. See, e.g., INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041 (a) (1).
271. This technique has been utilized in relation to joint tenancy
ownership of corporate securities. See M. REv. STAT. ANx. tit. 33,
§§ 902, 904 (1964).
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V. CONCLUSION
Roscoe Pound's charge to lawyers to look "more to the work-
ing of the law than to its abstract content"272 seems especially
significant for today's property law researcher. In the estab-
lishment of a factually accurate frame of reference for reforming
ownership and transfer laws, the practices and attitudes of cur-
rent owners seem at least as relevant as the a priori impressions
of an ancient legislature or some jurist long in his grave.273 Em-
pirical research in this study has revealed that the major features
of the current law dealing with joint tenancy fail to accord with
the wishes of most property owners. Certainly no one would
argue that the only function of law is to enable people to do what
they wish; in many areas the law must prevent people from do-
ing what they wish in order to protect the interests of others.
But in the area of joint tenancy, there seems to be little reason
for maintaining current policies essentially at odds with prop-
erty owners' desires. Legislative reform as proposed herein
would go far in bringing this law into line with the intention
of property owners while at the same time safeguarding the
rights of creditors and other interested persons.
APPENDIX
In the appendices which follow, results are presented in
tables which show the incidence of joint tenancy usage by the
variables of property type, occupation, age, value, the relation-
ship of the joint owner and the reasons for selecting the form.
The tables are constructed in such a way as to focus attention
on the property owned rather than the owners. Therefore, they
show the frequency with which the particular variables studied
were present for each type of property. The frequency of a
particular variable is shown in raw numbers, except in large
tables where percentage figures facilitate understanding.
272. Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25
HARv. L. REv. 489, 512-13 (1912).
273. See Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical In-
quiry and Legal Policy in LAw DT A CnANGING ASERICA 57 (Hazard ed.
1968); Hazard, The American Bar Foundation Program for Assisting
Law Review Research, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 418, 419 (1968); Berger, The
Research Frontiers of Real Property Law: Commercial Land Transfers,
15 J. LEaAL ED. 282, 285 (1963).
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Property Type Total o U . 0
1 Home Farm 82 67.1 9.8 0.0 19.5 2.4 0.0 1.2
2 Second Farm 49 63.3 10.2 0.0 24.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
3 Third Farm 10 70.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 Growing Crops 39 38.5 20.5 7.7 28.2 0.0 2.6 2.6
5 Home 94 83.0 3.2 0.0 10.7 2.1 0.0 1.1
6 Other City Lots 10 80.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
7 Bus. Real State 10 20.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
8 Second House 2 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
9 Summer Cottage 2 50.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
10 Rental Property 11 72.7 0.0 0.0 18.2 9.1 0.0 0.0
11 Real Property 6 66.7 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
12 Trucks 72 16.7 5.6 0.0 75.0 0.0 2.8 0.0
13 Tractors 81 32.1 4.9 0.0 60.5 0.0 1.2 1.2
14 Other Machinery 65 27.7 6.2 0.0 63.1 0.0 1.5 1.5
15 Equipment 40 17.5 10.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 0.0 2.5
16 Livestock 74 31.1 8.1 0.0 56.8 0.0 2.7 1.4
17 Severed Crops, &
Comm. Feed 33 24.2 15.2 0.0 54.6 0.0 3.0 3.0
18 Bus. Assets 17 35.3 5.9 0.0 47.1 0.0 5.9 5.9
19 Stock 64 54.7 1.6 7.8 31.3 3.1 0.0 1.6
20 Bonds 53 71.'7 0.0 5.7 18.8 3.8 0.0 0.0
21 Say. Accts. & Time Certif. 91 81.3 0.0 4.4 11.0 3.3 0.0 0.0
22 Checking Account 173 89.0 0.0 1.7 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
23 Safety Deposit Box 75 61.3 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 34.7
24 Automobile #1 168 39.3 6.5 0.6 50.0 3.0 0.0 0.6
25 Automobile #2 10 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
26 Boat, Airplane, etc. 15 13.1" 6.7 0.0 73.3 6.7 0.0 0.0
27 Truck (nonfarm) 16 6.3 0.0 0.0 93.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
28 Housetrailer 4 50.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29 Jewelry & Antiques 10 40.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0
30 Sales Cont. & Mortgage 17 35.3 5.9 0.0 41.2 5.9 5.9 5.9
31 Life Ins. & Employee
Benefits 137 0.7 0.0 0.0 98.5 0.7 0.0 0.0
32 Other Personal Property 9 22.2 11.1 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
33 Household Goods 127 70.9 3.1 0.0 19.7 0.8 0.0 5.5
* The classification '"Multiple Ownership" was arbitrarily used when-
ever more than two parties were co-ovners. Many of these would also
be joint tenancies in all likelihood.
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APPENDIX II
Holding Pattern by Value(All Property)
0 0M
N cO
VALUE ($) E-1 01 UA W A 0E-
0-500 169 4 4 97 8 1 0 193
501-1000 97 11 1 74 3 0 1 187
1001-2000 87 11 2 96 5 1 2 205
2001-3000 122 11 2 86 4 1 3 229
3001-5000 74 6 3 81 4 1 4 173
5001-10,000 65 14 2 70 1 4 4 160
10,001-20,000 74 8 4 66 2 3 0 157
20,001-40,000 41 2 0 29 2 0 0 74
40,001-60,000 24 2 0 20 1 0 0 47
60,001-80,000 15 3 0 9 0 0 0 27
80,001-120,000 6 3 0 6 1 0 1 17
120,001 and over 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
* The classification "Multiple Ownership" was arbitrarily used when-
ever more than two parties were co-owners. Many of these would also
be joint tenancies in all likelihood.
APPENDIX IlI
Holding Patterns by Age Groups
AGE
How Held og C- W5
Joint Tenancy 47 100 142 137 81 89 125 112 833
Tenancy in Common 3 4 9 11 18 4 19 8 76
Multiple Ownership 0 3 1 1 1 3 1 9 19
Sole Ownership by Hus. 32 63 82 118 67 127 70 90 649
Sole Ownership by Wife 1 5 5 3 3 4 4 7 32
Other 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 5 11
No Response 3 3 5 13 3 5 10 4 46
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11ow Held ENO 0i ~ C2U
Joint Tenancy 833 41 392 63 39 160 65 3 63 7
Tenancy in Common 76 1 60 3 0 6 0 2 2 2
Multiple Ownership 19 3 9 2 0 2 1 0 2 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 649 31 388 56 28 78 30 3 20 4
Sole Ownership by Wife 32 6 12 3 2 2 3 0 4 0
Other 11 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No Response 46 5 29 3 6 3 3 0 0 3
APPENDIX V
Sources of Influence on Holding Form
SOURCE OF INFLUENCE
O Q




EHovwHeld E-1 z go 14U 0
Joint Tenancy 833 682 51 52 7 0 1 3 2 4 8 9 9 2 1 2
Tenancy in
Common 76 61 12 2 1
Multiple
Ownership 19 16 2 1
Sole Ownership
by Husband 649 630 17 1 1
Sole Ownership
by Wife 32 29 2 1
Other 11 7 4
No Response 46 46
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Tenancy in Common 762
Multiple Ownership 19
Sole Ownership by Husband 649




13 794 17 6 3 0
2 51 1 22 0 0
4 11 3 0 0 1
636 13 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 5 0 2 2
44 1 0 1 0 0
APPENDIX VII*
Auto Ownership by Age Group
I? I T
M- 0 ?b 10 !8 0
Joint Tenancy 66 3 6 14 9 5 9 11 9
Tenancy in Common 11 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0
Multiple Ownership 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 84 7 13 9 13 9 10 11 12
Sole Ownership by Wife 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2
Auto Ownership by Occupation
E4. $4
Joint Tenancy 66 5 27 7 5 11 4 0 6 0
Tenancy in Common 11 0 5 1 0 2 0 1 0 2
Multiple Ownership 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 84 4 42 4 5 16 9 0 3 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
* The tables above report the ownership patterns for only the first
automobile reported by any respondent. The ownership pattern for
second cars closely parallels the information presented above.
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Auto Ownership by Value
[Vol. 54:509
0 oD M C
E- C> CD-4 ,-
Joint Tenancy 64 7 18 20 16 2 0 1
Tenancy in Common 11 0 3 4 4 0 0 0
Multiple Ownership 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 84 19 20 30 15 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 4 0 0 1 3 0 0 0
Other
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E-, E-1 U0 2.0 W.0 0 z
72 :12 4 54
81 .2 6 4 49
65 :18 4 41
40 7 4 28
74 23 6 42
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APPENDIX X
Holding Patterns by Co-owner Relation
(Farm Chattels*)
0 0o
Joint Tenancy 94 84 6 0 0 4
Tenancy in Common 27 15 0 11 0 1
Multiple Ownership 8 0 5 1 2 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 167 . . . . .
Sole Ownership by Wife 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0
No Response 4 0 0 0 0 4
* The table consolidates the information collected separately regarding
farm trucks, tractors, machinery, equipment, livestock, and severed
crops.
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How Held E' t o
Joint Tenancy 90 0 90 0 0
Tenancy in Common 4 0 3 0 1
Sole Ownership by Husband 25 23 2 0 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 1 1 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
No Response 7 7 0 0 0
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Joint Tenancy 90 3 0 9 18 44 14 2
Tenancy in Common 4 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
sole ownership by Husband 25 0 1 1 5 9 8 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
No Response 7 0 0 1 1 2 2 1
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Sole Ownership by Husband




35 32 2 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0
5 3 1 0 0 1 0
20 1 0 0 0 0 19
2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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0 0 0 0 0 1
HO HLE- o q o 0 C14
Joint~ ~  Teac 3510385 6 10
Tennc i Cmon101 0~ 0 0 04 0 0
MutpeOnesi 0 1011 0 01
Sole Ownership by Husband 20 6 1 2 3 1 1 3 0 1Sole Ownership by Wife 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Joint Tenancy 310 3 8 5 65 1 02
Tenancy in Common1010 0 0 0 0 0
Multiple Ownership 53 1 2 1 0 01
Sole Ownership by Husband 2 0 0 10 0 1
Sole Ownership by Wife 20101 0 0 0 0
No Response 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
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HOW HET~ E-1 & U2O
Joint Tenancy 38 30 5 1 2
Tenancy in Common 0 0 0 0 0
Multiple Ownership 3 2 1 0 0
Sole Ownership by Husband 10 0 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 2 0 0 0 0
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
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Ownership Pattern by Value
(Checking Accounts)
VALUE
Tenacy n Cmmon0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0,- 4 -4 .4
MutileOwerhi 02 0 0 0 0 0
HOWEELD 6 C, C. =
Joint Tenancy 154 4 96 21 12 12 7 2 0
Tenancy inommon 0 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0
Multiple Ownership 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sole Ownership by Husband 15 1 3 4 5 2 0 0 0
Sole Ownership by Wife 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPENDIX XVII















151 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 2
0 0 0 15
0 0 0 1







Sole Ownership by Husband
Sole Ownership by Wife
I0
E4 U2)
74 73 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
4 3 0 0 1
10 0 0 0 10
3 0 0 0 3
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